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The law is as stated on 31 December 1996 
T H E EUROPEAN SOCIAL DIALOGUE: THE R O L E OF 
MANAGEMENT AND LABOUR IN THE CREATION OF EUROPEAN 
SOCIAL REGULATION 
by Elinor Campbell, University of Durham 
Proposals for social regulation at the level of the European Community have proved highly 
controversial. The Protocol and Agreement on Social Policy (SPA), agreed at Maastricht, 
provide the potential for a more expansive framework of Community social regulation by setting 
out wider express legal bases for social action than were previously available in the EC Treaty. 
The SPA also introduces into the decision making process an extended role for the 
representatives of management and labour, the "social partners" both in the creation and 
implementation of social regulation. This "social dialogue" process allows regulation to take the 
form either of legislation or collective agreements. The SPA applies to 14 of the 15 Member 
States, excluding the UK, whose Conservative Government remain staunchly opposed to 
increases in social regulation. 
This thesis aims to consider the impact of the introduction of the social dialogue process on the 
creation of European social regulation. After an assessment of the background to the social 
dialogue, the new decision making process is examined in detail. Consideration is given to the 
scope of the new legal bases, the practical difficulties inherent within the consultation and 
negotiation processes and the possibilities for the adoption of European level collective 
agreements. The thesis then turns to a theoretical assessment of the social dialogue in the light 
of the European Community's commitments to subsidiarity and democracy. 
The main conclusion drawn is that the SPA social dialogue has created the potential for the 
autonomous development of European collective labour law. However, a combination of the 
present inefficiencies of the social dialogue procedure and the personalities involved in the 
dialogue make the fulfilment of this potential unlikely in the near future. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Since its inception proposals to extend the regulatory role of the European Community 
within the sphere of social law, and in particular those conceming industrial relations and 
labour law, have proved highly controversial.' Member States have been reluctant to 
relinquish sovereignty in these key areas which have been shaped by national historical, 
cultural and economic conditions. However, as European economic integration has 
progressed, and in particular since the completion of the Internal Market in 1992, 
companies have increasingly restmctured along European, rather than national lines.^ In 
consequence there have been increasing calls for both corresponding social regulation at 
European level and progress towards a European industrial relations system.^  
The Protocol and Agreement on Social Policy"* were introduced as annexes to the EC 
Treaty as part of the amendments made by the Treaty on European Union. The SPA 
provides the potential for a more expansive framework of European social regulation by 
setting out wider express legal bases for action.^ In addition the SPA promotes an 
extended role for the representatives of management and labour, the "social partners", in 
the development and implementation of European social regulation through the social 
1 
Eg Burrows and Mair, European Social Law, Wiley, 1996, at 5-12, and Nielsen and Szyszczak, 
The Social Dimension of the European Community, Handelshojskolens Forlag, 1993, at 18-36. 
Fernet and Hyman, "Industrial Relations in the New Europe: Seventeen Types of Ambiguity", in 
Hyman and Ferner, Industrial Relations in the New Europe, Blackwell, 1992, at xvii-xviii and 
Maiginson and Sisson, "The Structure of Transnational Capital in Europe: The Emerging Euro-
Company and its Implications for Industrial Relations", in Hyman and Ferner, New Frontiers in 
European Industrial Relations, Blackwell, 1994. 
Eg Kopke, "European Collective Bargaining: The New Configuration" in, The European 
Dimensions of Collective Bargaining After Maastricht, ETUI, 1992. 
Hereafter referred to as the "Protocol" and the "SPA" respectively. Both documents are 
reproduced as Annex 1 below. 
Art 2 SPA. 
dialogue procedure.^ The term "social dialogue" refers to the wide-ranging consultations 
between the social partners and also between the social partners and the Commission of 
the EC which existed prior to the SPA.^  The social dialogue procedure provides a legal 
framework with the potential for the development of European social regulation which 
takes greater account of the practical needs of the two sides of industry^ and which strikes 
a balance between legislation and collective agreements negotiated by the social partners. 
As such Padraig Flynn, Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs, has stated that 
the social dialogue is probably the best means to respond to the constantly evolving needs 
of European society.^ 
This thesis aims to consider the impact of the new social dialogue procedure on the 
creation of European level social regulation. After an assessment of the background to 
the social dialogue, the new regulatory procedure will be described in detail. Conclusions 
wil l be drawn as to how the input of the social partners will affect the initiation and 
substantive content of European social regulation and also as to whether future regulation 
is likely to take the form of binding legislation or collective agreements. The input of the 
social partners into the Community decision-making process will also be assessed in light 
of the Community's commitment to the principles of subsidiarity and democracy. 
The situation of the social dialogue procedure within the SPA and therefore outside the 
main body of the EC Treaty, as an annex to the Protocol on Social Policy, means that the 
effects of the involvement of the social partners cannot be treated in isolation. 
Consideration will therefore also be given to the legal status of the Protocol and SPA and 
the measures arising from them. The conclusions drawn will consider the role of the 
Arts 3 and 4 SPA. 
See Chapter 2. 
Council Resolution on Certain Aspects for a European Union Social Policy: A Contribution to 
Economic and Social Convergence in the Union, 1994 OJ C 368/03, 23 December 1994, Part II, 
para 3 encourages the use of agreements since "they are as a rule closer to social reality and to 
social problems". See also Roberts, "Industrial Relations and the European Community", (1992) 
23 IRJ, 3-31, at 9. 
"Social Dialogue - The Situation in the Community in 1995", Social Europe 2/95, 5. 
7 
social dialogue within the Community regulatory process and make some suggestions as 
to how this role may develop in the future. 
Although it is recognised that the social partners make a substantial input into the 
creation of European public policy"' the scope of this thesis will be limited to a 
consideration of the regulatory role of the social dialogue under the SPA. In consequence 
the thesis will be concerned with the intersectoral social dialogue, rather than the 
sectoral" or enterprise level dialogue.'^ 
Eg the contribution of the social partners to the development of a European Confidence Pact for 
Employment. 
" Eg Bercusson, "European Labour Law and Sectoral Bargaining", (1993) 24 IRJ, 257-272. 
Eg Roberts, "Multinational Collective Bargaining: A European Prospect?", (1973) 11 BJIR, 1-19. 
8 
Chapter 2 
T H E CHANGING R O L E OF T H E SOCIAL DIALOGUE AT 
EUROPEAN L E V E L 
Introduction 
The Treaty establishing the EEC was largely focussed on economic, rather than social, 
integration. "An accelerated raising of the standard of living" was to occur as a 
consequence of "establishing a Common Market and progressively approximating the 
economic policies of the Member States".' However, despite this focus on economic 
integration, since its inception the Community has recognised the positive input that 
could be made by some form of dialogue with the social partners.^  The role of the social 
partners within the SPA is the product of a continually evolving concept of this social 
dialogue. 
This chapter proposes to trace the historical background of the social dialogue at 
European level and assess the changes in its nature and role within the Community 
decision-making process. Since the focus of this thesis concerns the new role accorded 
to the social dialogue by the SPA this chapter will present a simplified account centring 
on the difficulties encountered in the creation of a forum for successful cross-industry 
social dialogue. 
Phase 1: The Economic and Social Committee 
The original Treaty of Rome provided a formal, consultative role for the social partners 
as part of the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC).^ ECOSOC was set up as a 
1 Art 2 E E C . 
Spyropoulos, "Labour Law and Labour Relations in Tomorrow's Social Europe", (1990) 29 
International Labour Review, 733-750, at 741. 
Arts 193-198 E E C . 
mouthpiece for a variety of economic and social interests so that these views could be 
conveyed to the European institutions involved in the estabhshment of the Common 
Market. The Committee consists of "representatives of the various categories of 
economic and social activity",'' which can, in practice, be divided into three distinct 
groups; the employers' group, the workers' group and the various interests' group.' The 
various interests' group includes representatives of farmers, traders, craftsmen, members 
of co-operatives, small businessmen, members of the professions, consumers, 
conservationists and the general public. 
ECOSOC has a right to be consulted on a variety of subjects where the Treaty so 
provides,^ notably, for our purposes, under Articles 118 and 118a, and may also be 
consulted by the Council or Commission in other cases where "they consider it 
appropriate".^ Its views are set out in Opinions adopted at Plenary Sessions by a straight 
majority vote and subsequently published in the Official Journal of the EC. Such 
Opinions enable the Commission to ascertain the likely impact of proposals on those 
most directly concerned. Consultation occurs before adoption of the particular measure 
and hence allows ECOSOC to suggest amendments. 
However, in its early years considerable dissatisfaction with the functioning of ECOSOC 
was registered. At the very first meeting in May 1958^ its members expressed 
disappointment with the committee's mere "advisory status",^  a limited role which 
permits the Council of Ministers to ignore or disregard an Opinion without giving 
reasons. This consultative role was originally further restricted by the ECOSOC's lack 
of a right to express Opinions of its own initiative, but only when called upon to do so 
Art 193 E E C . 
"The Economic and Social Committee", ESC-94-013-EN, Brussels, 1994. 
Art 198 E E C . 
Art 198 E E C . 
Barnouin, The European Labour Movement and European Integration, Frances Pinter, 1986, at 
80. 
Art 193 E E C . 
10 
by the Council and Commission. It was not until October 1972 at the meeting of the 
Heads of Government of the European Community in Paris that this right of initiative 
was secured.'" In addition, consultation occurred after the Commission had adopted a 
draft proposal, limiting ECOSOC's influence on the broad policy principles behind the 
proposal.'' As a result Opinions became increasingly technical, informative documents. 
Early dissatisfaction was also expressed by the workers' group regarding the composition 
of ECOSOC. The workers group had serious reservations about the presence of the 
various interests' group, many of whom they considered to be representatives of 
employers. Such resentment led to claims by the ETUC'^ of under-representation. 
Phase 2: Social Dialogue As A Response to Recession 
Dissatisfied with the role of ECOSOC, the social partners proposed the creation of an 
additional forum where the social dialogue could contribute to the preparation of 
Community economic and social policy decisions. Concerned about high levels of 
unemployment,''* the Commission agreed to discuss the proposal as it was anxious to 
involve the social partners in policy making in an attempt to achieve a more effective 
employment policy which would bring job supply and demand further into line. A 
reflection of the social partners increasing policy-making role, in 1970 the Commission's 
proposal to the Council on the phasing in of economic and monetary union stressed the 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
'The First Summit Conference of the Enlarged Community", Bulletin of the E C , 10-1972. The 
decision of the Council did not become official until February 1974, after the relevant changes in 
internal procedures had been made. However, the right of initiative has been utilised by ECOSOC 
since the date of the Paris meeting in October 1972. This right of initiative has now been given 
Treaty recognition in Art 198 EC, as amended by the Treaty on European Union. See Barnouin, 
op cit, at 81. 
Social Europe 1988, Special Edition, at 108. Interest groups prefer to lobby the Commission or 
individual members of the Council of Ministers during the process of formulating a proposal. See, 
for example, Harlow, "A Community of Interests? Making the Most of European Law", (1992) 
55 MLR, 331-350. 
Social Europe 1988, Special Edition. 
European Trade Union Congress. 
See Annex 2. 
11 
importance of working closely with both sides of industry on the general directions of 
economic policy. 
In response a tripartite conference was convened in Luxembourg on 27-28 April 1970.'^  
The conference decided that similar tripartite conferences should take place regularly and 
agreed to the formation of the Standing Committee on Employment (SCE), a committee 
which has since met two to three times a year,'^  and whose task it is to "ensure close 
contact at European Level... with the representatives of the employers' and workers' 
organisations to facilitate co-ordination by the Member States of their employment 
policies in harmony with the objectives of the Community."'^ The conference also 
concluded that the employment situation could be improved through a more effective use 
of existing labour reserves. Before any new policy could be formulated, however, the 
new SCE was charged with carrying out statistical work concerning the structure of 
unemployment in national labour markets since existing national, independently 
collected, statistical data could not effectively be compared. 
The SCE allows consultation and dialogue between the four parties involved, the 
representatives of workers, employers, the Council and Commission,and is presided 
over by the labour minister of the country holding the Council presidency. Although a 
mere consultative body with no decision-making authority, a feature which has detracted 
from the effectiveness of the SCE,^° as ECOSOC, dialogue within the SCE has not been 
completely without success. Several clauses of the 1975 Collective Redundancies 
16 
17 
19 
COM(70) 1250, 29 October 1970. 
Barnouin, ibid, at 6. 
Although not from 1972-5. See below. 
Council Decision on the Creation of a Permanent Committee on Employment, OJ 1970 L 273/25, 
17 December 1970. See also Bulletin of the EC, 7-1970, 64. 
Social Europe 2/84, at 10-11 and Social Europe 1988, Special Edition, at 109. 
Social Europe 2/95, 15. 
12 
Directive,^' for example, emerged as a result of negotiations within the SCE.^ ^ 
Despite the SCE's wide remit, however, the ETUC still found that social issues tended 
to be treated too narrowly, attention being focussed on examination of the labour market 
rather than the wider issues affecting unemployment. Again unhappy with the 
composition of the workers' representation,^ ^ the ETUC staged a boycott in 1972 and the 
Committee remained dormant until it was relaunched in January 1975 after representation 
had been revised.^'' 
Tripartite Conferences 
Even after changes in the composition of the workers representatives in the SCE, the 
Committee achieved little. During the boycott the ETUC had channelled its energy into 
the ad hoc tripartite conferences convened in response to the positive attitude given to the 
social dialogue by the Commission in its 1973 Social Action Programme.^ ^ These 
conferences were composed of representatives of the two sides of industry, the EEC 
institutions and representatives of the Member State governments. The government 
representatives included both ministers for labour and social affairs and economic and 
finance ministers, a composition which appealed to the ETUC since it allowed a wide 
discussion on unemployment matters to be undertaken. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Directive 75/129, OJ 1975 L 48/29, 17 February 1975. 
Interview with Carlo Savoini, Social Europe 2/95, 7. 
Barnouin, ibid, at 88 and Carley, "Social Dialogue" in Gold (ed), The Social Dimension -
Employment Policy in the European Community, Macmillan, 1993, at 107. The Socialist and 
Christian trade unions resented the presence of the French and Italian communist trade unions on 
both ideological grounds and also because they were national organisations without a transnational 
structure at Community level, making them unrepresentative. 
Council Decision of 20 January 1975, OJ 1975 L 21/17. This decision was taken in response to 
discussions regarding the SCE at the Tripartite Conference of 14 December 1974 (see below). 
24 October 1973. 
13 
Although the first three conferences^^ produced no concrete agreements, they were 
perceived as successfuP^ since genuine discussion had been conducted on a wide range 
of issues. Results were achieved, however, at the fourth conference on 24 June 1976 
which concentrated on the employment situation. For the first time the social dialogue 
concluded with a joint economic programme in which targets for employment creation 
and price stability were reached, a Joint Declaration agreed upon^^ and a steering 
committee set up to monitor progress. Although the Declaration had no legally binding 
force, the targets were subsequently reiterated in the Commission's 1977 medium-term 
economic policy programme^' and the Annual Report on the EEC's economic situation. ^ 
However, the momentum was slowed when it became clear that the targets set at the 
fourth conference were unrealistic. The fifth conference on 27 June 1977 on the subject 
of growth, stability and employment and which reviewed progress in the achievement of 
the targets was disappointing. A final conference took place on 9 November 1978 
concerned with the redistribution of available work. The lack of positive results this time 
prompted the ETUC's decision not to participate in any future similar conferences unless 
the possibility of reaching EC-level agreements was considered. Despite the adoption by 
the Council of measures improving the functioning of the conferences, none have since 
been held. 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
18 November 1975 concerning the economic and social situation in the Community, 16 December 
1974 on the economic recession, employment and equal treatment and 18 November 1975 
concerning a search for Community solutions to employment problems. See Social Europe 1988, 
Special Edition. 
Barnouin, op cit, at 91. 
"Joint statement by the Conference on the restoration of full employment and stability in the 
Community", Commission, 24 June 1976. 
E C Commission, Fourth Medium-Term Economic Policy Programme, OJ 1977 L 101, 25 April 
1977. 
E C Commission, Annual Report on the Economic Situation in the Community, Brussels, 29 Dec 
1976. 
14 
Phase 3: Social Dialogue As A Response to the Deadlock of the 1980s 
With unemployment rising sharply at the beginning of the 1980s the enthusiasm for 
social dialogue continued. On 5 April 1984 the President of the Council of Ministers, the 
French Prime Minister, M Pierre Mauroy reiterated the "urgent need for a trustful 
dialogue between the European government and both sides of industry. The dialogue 
must not only be trustful but also constructive, with about 11% of the working population 
in the Community currently unemployed."^' 
However, initially a response to the problem of unemployment, the focus of the social 
dialogue began to shift in the years after the Thatcher Conservative Government came 
into power in 1979. 
The Deadlock in Social Action 
Social action pursuant to the Commission's Social Action Programme of 1974^ ^ had been 
relatively successful between 1975 and 1980 with the enactment of several Directives on 
social policy.^^ However, progress effectively ended after 1979 when the Thatcher 
Conservative Government of the UK came into power.^ " Heavily influenced by free 
market economics,^ ^ the national labour law policy of the UK Conservative government 
promoted a high degree of flexibility within the employment relationship in order to 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
E T U C Conference on Employment, Strasbourg, 5 April 1984. 
OJ 1974 C 12, 9 February 1974. 
Eg Council Directive 75/129/EEC, OJ 1975 L48/29, 17 February 1975 (Collective 
Redundancies); Council Directive 77/187/EEC, OJ 1977 L61/27, 14 February 1977 (Transfer of 
Undertakings); Council Directive 80/987/EEC, OJ 1980 L283/23, 20 October 1980 (Insolvency). 
See Gold, "Overview of the Social Dimension", in Gold, The Social Dimension - Employment 
Policy in the European Community, Macmillan, 1993 and Lange, "The Politics of the Social 
Dimension", in Sbragia, Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the "New" European 
Community, Brookings Institution, Washington, 1992, at 241. 
Painter and Puttick, Employment Rights, Pluto Press, 1993, at 3; Wedderburn, Employment Rights 
in Britain and Europe, Insititute of Employment Rights, 1991; Deakin and Morris, Labour Law, 
Butterworths, 1995 and Teague and Grahl, Industrial Relations and European Integration, 
London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1992, at 77. 
15 
permit employers to adapt quickly to changes in the economic climate, allowing them to 
compete more effectively in international markets. 
In order to protect the integrity of this drive for flexibili ty the Conservatives have 
forcefully pursued their own national agenda at European level. Due to the requirement 
of unanimity in the Council of Ministers under the legal basis for legislative action of 
Article 100 EEC, the U K was able to veto proposed Directives on part-time work and 
temporary work,^* parental leav^^ and the Vredeling Directi'^^ on information and 
consultation in multinationals, amongst others.^' The U K continually opposed dirgiste 
employment policies on the basis that economic and employment growth could only be 
achieved by a reduction in burdens on business. Such burdens in the form of excessive 
labour regulation and the attendant increases in the unit costs of labour would, in the view 
of the Conservatives, decrease the competitiveness of European industry in international 
markets.'*^ As a result the only employment initiative which was successful during this 
period was a Directive on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the 
health and safety of workers 
The Delors Initiative 
In January 1985 Jacques Delors took up the position of President of the European 
Commission and provided the enthusiasm for a new type of social dialogue. While 
previous initiatives had involved the social partners in a consultative, policy-making role 
tailored towards the achievement of a social consensus in order to alleviate 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
COM(90) 228, OJ 1990 C 224/90, 8 September 1990. 
OJ 1983 C 333, 9 December 1983, amended version OJ 1984 C 316, 27 November 1984. 
OJ 1980 C 297, 15 November 1980, amended version OJ 1983 C 217, 12 August 1983. 
However, see Whiteford, "W(h)ither Social Policy?", in Shaw and More, New Legal Dynamics 
of European Union, Clarendon: Oxford, 1995, at 115 who argues the UK may not have been the 
only Member State reluctant to agree to the adoption of social policy measures. 
See Teague and Grahl, ibid, at 77. 
Directive 89/391/EEC, OJ 1989 L 183/1, 12 June 1989. 
16 
unemployment, Delors visualised an autonomous regulatory role for the social dialogue 
as a response to the social policy deadlock.''^ Declarations of his high hopes for the social 
dialogue were presented in the Commission's programme to the European Parliament in 
March 19S5'^^ where he stated that "a European collective agreement is not just an empty 
slogan. It would provide a dynamic framework, one that respected differing views - a 
spur to initiative, not a source of paralysing uniformity'"*^ and that reforms to employment 
and labour market policies "must be negotiated by the two sides of industry, in other 
words collective bargaining must remain one of the cornerstones of our economy, and 
efforts must be made to secure some harmonisation at Community level.'"*^ 
This vision of European collective bargaining formed part of Delors' espace sociale in 
which agreements achieved by consensus between the social partners could form the 
basis of Community legislative action.'*'' It seems that Delors hoped that such agreements 
would be more acceptable to the U K due to the input and consent of the representatives 
of employers.''^ In this respect Delors is reported to have made a statement to the social 
partners that the Commission was prepared to cease developing new social policy 
proposals i f the parties entered into such a dialogue."*^ 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
Carley, ibid, at 108; Teague, "Constitution of Regime? The Social Dimension to the 1992 
Project", (1989) BJIR, 310-328, at 318 and Hepple, "European Social Dialogue - Alibi or 
Opportunity?", Institute of Employment Rights, 1993, at 12. 
'The Thrust of Commission Policy", Statement by Jacques Delors, President of the Commission, 
to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 14-15 January 1985, Bulletin of the E C , Supp 1/85. 
Delors, ibid, at 9. 
Delors, ibid, at 11. 
'The Social Dimension of the Internal Market", Information Memo, Brussels, 7 September 1988, 
stated that "the Commission is convinced that the social dialogue is essential to progress in 
building Europe, since it leads to agreements that can subsequently be transformed into proposals 
for Community regulations." 
Streeck, "European Social Policy After Maastricht: The 'Social Dialogue' and 'Subsidiarity"', 
(1994) 15 Economic and Industrial Democracy, 151-177, at 166, Teague, "Constitution or 
Regime? The Social Dimension to the 1992 Project", op cit, 318. 
Teague, The European Community: The Social Dimension, London: Kogan Page, 1989, at 69. 
17 
The Val Duchesse Social Dialogue 
In order to put this vision of the social dialogue into operation Delors initiated talks 
between representatives of the ETUC, UNICE,^' CEE?^° and the Commission at Val 
Duchesse, a palace outside Brussels, on 31 January 1985, where talks took place on the 
structural and cyclical aspects of the current economic and social situation.^' 
I t was not until a second meeting on 12 November 1985, where discussion centred on 
"the co-operative growth strategy for more employment" , that any concrete action 
resulted. At the end of the meeting the social partners adopted a joint declaration on the 
social dialogue and new technologies^-' and agreed on the establishment of two working 
parties, the first, the "macroeconomics working party", to examine growth, employment 
and investment in the Community and the second, the "new technologies working party", 
to look at the possibility of a Community approach to social dialogue on the introduction 
of new technologies.These working parties were set up in Spring 1986, made up of 
representatives of the trade unions and employers, with one representative from each 
category from each Member State, and chaired by a member of the C o m m i s s i o n . B o t h 
proved successful in concluding agreements in the form of Joint Opinions.^* The social 
partners and the Commission met again on 7 May 1987 when these Joint Opinions were 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
Union des Confederations de I'lndustries des Employeurs d'Europe. 
Centre Europeen des Moyennes Entreprises. 
Bulletin of the E C , 1-1985, point 2.4.19. 
Social Europe 1988, Special Edition, at 110. 
Commission, Joint Opinions, European Social Dialogue Series, 1991. 
Bulletin of the E C 11-1985, point 2.5.15. 
See Carley, op cit, at 114-115 for details of the composition and action of the working parties. 
The New Technologies Working Party concluded a Joint Opinion on Training, Motivation, 
Information and Consultation Relating to New Technologies on 6 March 1987. The 
macroeconomic working party concluded a Joint Opinion in which UNICE, ETUC and CEEP 
reaffirmed their support for the strategy set out in Commission's 1986-7 Annual Economic Report 
on 6 March 1987 and a Joint Opinion on Co-operative Growth Strategy on 6 November 1986. 
See Bulletin of the E C , 3-1987, para 2.1.93 and Bulletin of the E C , 5-1987, para 2.1.100 and 
Roberts, "Industrial Relations and the European Community", (1992) 23 IRJ, 3-13, at 5. 
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endorsed and the President of the Council, Mr Wilfred Martins, announced his intentions 
to forward the agreements to the European Council on 29-30 June." 
However, this initial outward success of the "Val Duchesse dialogue"'^ was impaired by 
the fact that UNICE had insisted from the outset that the Commission should make 
assurances that any agreements reached should not be used as a basis for proposals for 
legislation.^^ While the Commission had agreed to this proviso in order that the talks 
should still take place, the conclusion of agreements which committed none of the parties 
to any action and could not be used as a platform for future Community action, seriously 
undermined the original purpose of the Delors social dialogue.* The Joint Opinions had 
no legally binding effect, but functioned merely as "an expression of views on a particular 
issue".^' A study conducted by the Directorate-General for Employment and Social 
Affairs^^ noted that the social dialogue "remained in Brussels", as, after agreement, no 
further impetus by the Commission or the social Partners provided any follow up action. 
Subsequent meetings of the working groups failed to produce additional Joint Opinions. 
The macroeconomics group convened in 1988, but no agreement was reached on the 
Commission's 1988-89 Annual Economic Report and, despite numerous meetings, the 
new technologies group failed to reach agreement on an Opinion. 
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For a positive view of the outcome of Val Duchesse see Spyropoulos, op cit, 733-750 and 
Roberts, op cit, at 6 who notes that Val Duchesse was important for the social partners to "become 
accustomed to systematic and structures European-level contacts and deliberations". 
Teague, "Constitution or Regime? The Social Dimension to the 1992 Project", op cit, at 318. 
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Teague and Grahl, op cit, at 82. 
Commission,"Eight Years of Intersectoral Social Dialogue at Community Level", November 
1992, as quoted in Hepple, op cit, at 17. 
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Relaunching the Social Dialogue 
The Single European Act of 1986 provided Treaty recognition for the concept of social 
dialogue. Article 118b of the amended Treaty of Rome states that, "the Commission 
shall endeavour to develop the dialogue between management and labour at European 
level which could, i f the two sides consider it desirable, lead to relations based on 
agreement". However, the provision was criticised as a weak, "political gesture",^^ since 
it provided no procedures for the functioning of the dialogue and caused ambiguity over 
the dialogue's legal results. 
As a response to the new Article 118b the Val Duchesse social dialogue was relaunched 
by Jacques Delors and the new Commissioner for Social Affairs, Vasso Papandreou, on 
12 January 1989" with a meeting of the Commission and the social partners at the Palais 
d'Egmont. With the creation of a Steering Committee made up of representatives of the 
social partners and chaired by the Commission, the social dialogue to some extent gained 
the formal stability it had previously been lacking.^' This group was to promote new 
social dialogue initiatives and to evaluate and provide an impetus for action as a follow 
up to Joint O p i n i o n s . D e l o r s suggested in his opening speech that discussions should 
take place as a priority on the issues of permanent vocational training and problems 
arising f rom the creation of a European labour market. Ms Papandreou reported that the 
Commission would issue an annual report on the employment situation and trends within 
the Community for discussion by the social partners.^^ 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
Hepple, ibid, at 16. 
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Results were encouraging.^^ In its first meeting' the Steering Group established two 
working groups,™ the first concerned with education and training, which subsequently 
produced four Joint Opinions,^' and the second with prospects for a European Labour 
Market, which also produced two Joint Opinions.''^ The group also held discussions 
concerning promotion of Joint Opinions. However, the issue as to whether these 
Opinions could attain the status of framework agreements under Art 118b EEC was still 
rejected by the UNICE. 
The Social Charter 
Had the Social Charter''^ been adopted at the Strasbourg Summit,'''* the social dialogue 
would have gained a greater Community legitimacy, with the explicit possibility of 
concluding binding agreements.^^ The Charter declared that "dialogue between the two 
sides of industry at European level... may, i f the parties deem it desirable, result in 
contractual relations."^^ The Charter also recognised collective agreements as a means of 
guaranteeing the social rights outlined." However, the Social Charter was not adopted. 
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only a Solemn Declaration by the 11 Member States (excluding the UK) ensued, which 
was not binding on the Council, Commission or the Member States. An Action 
Programme^^ did, however, follow and the social dialogue Steering Committee was 
consulted by the Commission on all legislation proposed.™ 
On 16 September 1990 the ETUC and CEEP signed the "European Framework 
Agreement"^" which had as its aim to enhance the Joint Opinions already agreed upon, 
in connection with public enterprises.^' The notable absence of UNICE underlined its 
objection to the conclusion of European level agreements, especially i f binding. 
This uncooperative attitude of UNICE added to the pre-existing difficulties surrounding 
the dialogue. Despite the successful agreement of several Joint Opinions in this phase 
of the history of social dialogue, progress was limited due to the generality of their 
subject matter,^^ the fact that they were confined to topics geared towards economic 
integration^^ and their lack of binding legal status, with no requirement for the signatory 
parties to provide any fol low up at national level. 
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The Maastricht Treaty 
In May 1991 at the ETUC Congress Delors stated the Commission was open to a 
strengthening of the role of the social partners.^ "* He suggested that framework 
agreements could be used as a mechanism for achieving Treaty aims. Surprisingly in 
October 1991, as a result of an ad hoc meeting between UNICE, CEEP and ETUC set up 
by the social dialogue Steering Committee, UNICE agreed with the other social partner 
organisations on a joint approach to the role of social dialogue which proposed this 
strengthened role for the social partners in the formulation and implementation of social 
policy. This agreement was submitted as a proposal^^ to the Presidents of the Council 
and Commission and the Inter-Governmental Conference on Political Union. The 
Commission put forward its proposals in May 1991 which included the extension of 
qualified majority voting in the area of social policy and called for a balance to be struck 
between regulation by legislation and by collective agreement. The agreement of UNICE 
demonstrated a significant change of heart with respect to the status of agreements 
conclude under the social dialogue. The agreement itself proposed, inter alia, that 
agreements concluded at Community level may be implemented either through national 
collective bargaining or be given legal status as a Council decision.** This shift in 
attitude may be attributable to the fact that, with legislation threatened in many social 
areas, UNICE saw joint regulation under the social dialogue as the lesser of two evils. 
The proposals of the social partners were incorporated almost verbatim in the Social 
Policy Agreement (SPA) agreed upon at the Maastricht European Council, 9-10 
December. The SPA pledges to consult the social partners before taking measures in the 
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social policy f ie ld and lays down a procedure for doing so.*^ The SPA also allows a 
Member State to entrust the social partners with the implementation of Directives^' and 
gives recognition to agreements concluded at European level, with the possibility of 
implementation by Council decisions.'" However, the social partners agreement 
originally took the form of a proposal for amendments to Articles 118, 118a and 118b of 
the Treaty of Rome. The objections of the U K Conservative Government to any 
extension of action at Community level within the social policy field led to its "opting-
out" of these provisions." As a result the proposals of the social partners were adopted 
by only 11 of the, then 12, Member States within the SPA which stands outside the EC 
Treaty.'^ 
A t a subsequent meeting of the social partners on 3 July 1992 at the Palais d'Egmont, 
at the invitation of Delors, the CEEP, ETUC and UNICE held a social dialogue summit 
to examine the future operation of the mechanisms provided for in the SPA. A Joint 
Statement on the future of social dialogue was adopted'^ which declared, inter alia, the 
parties' "determination to give a high profile to the social dialogue" and that the existing 
Steering Group and ad hoc working group to be replaced by a Social Dialogue 
Committee.''* Both the Commission and the social partners again confirmed their 
committment to the social dialogue by the opening of the European Centre for Industrial 
89 
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Relations on 20 October 1995. This centre w i l l serve as a focal point for research and 
training in social dialogue at European level. ' ' 
Conclusion 
The SPA represents a significant increase in the status of the social dialogue at European 
level. The role of the social partners has evolved from one of narrow consultation within 
the ECOSOC to their current central role within the formulation and implementation of 
European social policy. However, judged in concrete terms the historical background to 
the social dialogue is not impressive with few examples of agreement between the social 
partners. Previous initiatives have revealed difficulties in identifying a role for the social 
dialogue and creating a forum which satisfies all parties. In addition problems have been 
encountered in securing any form of agreement between the two sides of industry and in 
attributing binding status to the few agreements concluded. 
The social partners are now significant actors within the procedure for the creation and 
implementation of EU social regulation for the 14 Member State signatories of the SPA. 
The importance attributed to their views has been underlined by the creation of a formal, 
institutionalised. Treaty basis'* outlining the procedure for social dialogue. The 
fo l lowing three chapters detail the role accorded to the social partners within this new 
legislative procedure. 
Social Europe 2/95, at 8. 
'* See Chapter 2 for a discussion as to whether the SPA forms an amendment to the E C Treaty. 
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Chapter 3 
T H E PROTOCOL AND AGREEMENT ON SOCIAL POLICY 
Introduction 
The difficulties encountered in achieving agreement with the U K on social policy at 
Maastricht resulted in the conclusion of a compromise solution unprecedented in the 
history of the Community. In an arrangement that constitutes an example of Europe a la 
carte^ the Protocol on Social Policy, annexed to the amended Treaty of Rome, states that 
all of the, then 12, Member States agree to authorise the Member States in agreement^ to 
"continue along the path laid down in the 1989 Social Charter".^ In turn annexed to the 
Protocol, the SPA, which was signed by the, then 11, participating Member States, 
provides the necessary extension of legal bases in the social policy field so that they may 
achieve this objective. After the accession to the European Community of Austria, 
Sweden and Finland the Protocol and Agreement now apply to 14 Member States.'* 
The Protocol notes that the 14 are authorised to "have recourse to the institutions, 
procedures and mechanisms of the Treaty for the purposes of taking amongst themselves 
and applying as far as they are concemed the acts and decisions"' which give effect to the 
1 
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For a discussion of the problems associated with a "two-speed" Europe see Grabitz and 
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Law? An Unusual Approach to the Concept of Two-Speeds", (1984-5) Michigan Law Rev, 1274-
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Council Decision 95/1, amending the Treaty of Accession OJ 1995 L 1/1, 1 January 1995. 
Although the Protocol itself refers to only 11 Member States, in the light of the above decision 
it will be treated as if it refers to the 14 Member States in agreement. 
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SPA. The SPA itself provides the 14 with a greater potential for social policy action than 
is available under the EC Treaty. Article 1* sets out new general objectives to be 
achieved through the adoption of measures under the legal bases set out in Article 2. This 
is fol lowed up in Articles 3 and 4 by the creation of a two stage procedure for 
consultation with the social partners before the submission of proposals. The SPA states 
that the social dialogue may lead to "contractual relations, including agreements"^ and 
enables the social partners to avoid the adoption of binding Community legislation by the 
conclusion of collective agreements amongst themselves. 
The Protocol and SPA set out a framework for the operation of the new social policy 
competences and the social dialogue procedure. However, a subsequent Commission 
Communication* provides a detailed explanation as to how these competences are to 
operate in practice. 
The Position of the U K 
As far as the U K is concerned its representatives in the Council of Ministers "shall not 
take part in the deliberations and adoption by the Council of Commission proposals made 
on the basis of this Protocol and... Agreement".' In addition "acts adopted by the Council 
and any financial consequences other than administrative costs entailed for the 
institutions shall not be applicable"'° to the UK. " With respect to participation in the 
6 
9 
10 
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All references are assumed to refer the SPA unless otherwise specified. 
Art 4(1). 
Communication concerning the application of the Agreement on social policy presented by the 
Commission to the Council and European Parliament, COM(93) 600 final, 14 December 1993, 
hereafter known as the "Communication". 
Protocol, para 2. 
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However, in practice, many multinational companies covered by the Council Directive 94/45/EC, 
OJ L 254/64, 22 September 1994, the European Works Council Directive, have voluntarily 
included their UK employees. See Leighton, "Despite the Maastricht Opt-Out: The 
'Europeanisation' of UK Employment Practices", in Caiger and Floudas, 7996 Onwards: 
Lowering the Barriers Further, Wiley, 1996 and Southey, "Opt-Out Fails To Halt Spread of 
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Council of Ministers, therefore, the U K "shall not take part in the deliberations and the 
adoption by the Council of Commission proposals made on the basis of this Protocol and 
the above-mentioned Agreement". The Protocol also amends the voting majorities 
needed for qualified majority voting (QMV) and unanimity to exclude the UK. Although 
the British delegates are not necessarily forced out of the room, it seems they must remain 
passive in deliberations and votes on SPA issues.'^ 
As far as members of other EC institutions are concerned the Protocol is silent, making 
no changes as to composition. British members of the Commission, the Court of Justice 
and the European Parliament are in no way restricted by the Protocol on the basis that 
they are not the chosen representatives of their country, as are representatives of the 
Council.'^ While this seems reasonable for members of the Court and the Commission 
i t is questionable with respect to Members of the European Parliament who are directly 
elected by members of their own country. The European Parliament has, however, 
elected to allow members f rom the U K to participate.''' 
The European social partner organisations have national affiliations from all over Europe, 
including both the U K and countries which are not members of the European Union. 
Wi th respect to the social dialogue procedure of the SPA the organisations have made 
special arrangements. Although UNICE would "normally seek a consensus among its 
members" and "not adopt a position i f this is contrary to the vital and truly justified 
interests of one of its members" it has amended its Statutes to take into account the social 
dialogue. Article 7.1 of these Statutes states that "any draft agreement negotiated in the 
12 
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Works Councils", Financial Times, 12 July 1995. Similarly, many UK companies have 
voluntarily accepted the standards set out in the Parental Leave Agreement. See Taylor, "EU 
Landmark Social Accord", Financial Times, 7 November 1995. 
Falkner, 'The Maastricht Protocol on Social Policy: Theory and Practice", (1996) 6 JESP, 1-16, 
at 9. 
Watson, "Social Policy After Maastricht", (1993) 30 CML Rev, 481-513, at 503. 
(1994) 241 EIRR,3 . 
Membership of the ETUC, for example, includes national trade union confederations from Cyprus, 
Iceland, Malta, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. 
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framework of the dialogue between the social partners"is to be "approved by the 
Association on the basis of consensus among all the members affected by the agreement 
in question" (my emphasis).'^ Within the ETUC reform of its internal structure took 
place in 1991.''' The Constitution states that "the decision shall have the support of at 
least two thirds of the member organisations directly concerned by the negotiations" (my 
emphasis).'* 
Wi th in the negotiations concerning the European Works Council Directive" it was, 
however, agreed that representatives of the British CBI and TUC should take part. 
Ironically, although not directly affected by the Directive, the negotiations broke down 
as a result of the British. The CBI withdrew from the negotiations with only days to go 
before the end of the second consultation phase. Under UNICE's rules the CBI could not 
be outvoted and in addition the ETUC had made the CBI's presence a prerequisite.^" 
Without their presence any agreement to proceed with the negotiation phase was 
impossible. 
Since then the role of the CBI has been changed by an internal agreement within UNICE 
and approved by the ETUC. Although the CBI may continue to participate in 
negotiations, it no longer has a veto and w i l l not be bound by an agreement which it has 
not approved.^' In the subsequent negotiations concerning the issue of parental leave the 
C B I took part in the UNICE team only as an observer.^^ However, following the 
conclusion of an agreement under Article 4(1) SPA, the ETUC is calling on the CBI to 
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negotiate with the TUC on implementing the agreement voluntarily.^^ 
The UK's opt-out itself seems to have been intended as a temporary measure in the hope 
that agreement could be secured in the future. As such the Protocol can be compared to 
another Protocol concerning Economic and Monetary Policy from which the U K has also 
opted-out.^'' In the case of the latter Protocol, however, it is specified that the U K "may 
change its notification at any time...",^^ which would immediately render it bound by that 
Protocol's terms. Although a mechanism for opting-in is not specified in the Protocol on 
Social Policy it seems that, should the U K chose to do so,^ ^ the SPA would be 
accommodated as an amendment to the EC Treaty, as originally proposed.^'' 
"9 Is SPA Legislation "Community Law 
The uniqueness of the construction of the Protocol and the SPA has fuelled much 
discussion as to its legality.^* For our purposes this is relevant in so far as it relates to the 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
EIRR, Dec 1995. 
Protocol No 11 on Certain Provisions Relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. 
Protocol No 11, ibid, para 10. 
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JCMS, 23-51; Blanpain & Engels, European Labour Law, Kluwer, 1993; Szyszczak, "Social 
Policy: A Happy Ending or A Reworking of the Fairy Tale?" in O'Keeffe & Twomey, Legal 
Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, Wiley, 1994; Whiteford, "Social Policy After Maastricht", (1993) 
18 E L Rev, 202-222; Gold, "Social Policy: the UK and Maastricht", 139 National Institute 
Economic Review, 95-103; "Maastricht and Social Policy - Part Two", (1993) 239 EIRR, 19-24; 
Fitzpatrick, "Community Social Law After Maastricht", (1992) 21 ILJ, 199-213; Weiss, "The 
Significance of Maastricht for European Community Social Policy", (1992) IJCLLIR, 3-14; 
Barnard, "A Social Policy for Europe: Politicians 1:0 Lawyers", (1992) IJCLLIR, 15-31; 
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legal status of acts adopted under the SPA. 
Argument has centred on whether the Protocol and SPA are amendments to the Treaty 
of Rome and therefore form part of Community law or whether they are mere 
intergovernmental agreements. Article 239 EC states that Protocols annexed to the 
Treaty "by common accord of the Member States shall form an integral part thereof. 
The requirement for "common accord" is satisfied in the case of the Protocol since it was 
signed by all of the, then 12, Member States. The Protocol may therefore be regarded as 
forming part of the Treaty. However, a greater deal of controversy surrounds the status 
of the SPA. On the one hand since the SPA is annexed to the Protocol, i t may be seen 
as part of the Protocol and therefore, as a logical conclusion, part of the Treaty.^^ As a 
result any measures adopted under the SPA w i l l also form part of Community law. 
On the other hand. Article 236 EC^^ states that any amendments to the Treaty must occur 
by "common accord" and that they can enter into force only "after being ratified by all 
the Member States." Since the SPA was not signed by the UK, i t is arguable that it 
cannot therefore form an amendment to the Treaty.^' In this case the SPA must take the 
form of an intergovernmental agreement, an assertion which seems to be corroborated by 
the Preamble to the Protocol which notes that the Member States in agreement are 
authorised to "have recourse to the institufions, procedures and mechanisms" of the EC 
Treaty. As the SPA covers matters within an existing field of EC competence, the 
Protocol may then serve as a vehicle for the necessary consent of the U K to the 
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arrangement.^ ^ Any measures adopted under this intergovernmental agreement would be 
governed by public international law, rather than EC law and would require ratification 
in each case by each national Parliament.^^ 
The legal status of the SPA seems, therefore to depend upon its relationship with the 
Protocol. However, while the Protocol declares that the Agreement is "annexed" '^' to it, 
it does not detail the precise legal relationship between the two documents. Since the 
arrangement is unprecedented within the history of the Community, the issue must, at 
present, remain unsettled. 
Where the Social Chapter is considered to constitute an amendment to the EC Treaty, 
SPA directives can be defined by Article 189 EC as measures "binding, as to the result 
to be achieved". As such, in principle, individuals may enforce their Community rights 
by reliance on national implementing measures^ ^ and the remedies available at 
Community level. In the case that the SPA is instead an intergovernmental agreement, 
it has been argued that references to "directives" and "decisions" may not refer to their 
EC Treaty counterparts as defined by Article 189 EC and the attendant case law of the 
Court of Justice, or be consistent with them.^ ^ However, the Preamble to the Protocol 
states that "this Protocol and the said Agreement are without prejudice to the provisions 
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of this Treaty, particularly those which relate to social policy which constitute an integral 
part of the 'acquis communautaire'" and the Preamble to the SPA purports to implement 
the 1989 Social Charter "on the basis of the 'acquis communautaire'"." It is submitted 
that even i f the SPA merely "borrows" the EC institutions, it also borrows its attendant 
principles and case law. Whether or not the SPA forms an amendment to the EC Treaty 
or an intergovernmental agreement, an individual may therefore be equally protected by 
both EC Treaty directives and SPA directives. 
Challenging the Status of the Protocol and Agreement 
Although the European Court of Justice has expressed an Opinion upon the European 
Economic Area (EEA) Treaty,^' it seems unlikely that a similar challenge could be made 
to the legal status of the SPA. The Opinion on the EEA was only possible since it was 
an agreement between the Community and an international organisation under Article 
228 EC. The Commission was therefore able to obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice 
under the express power given to it in Article 228(6) EC. There is no similar express 
power in the Treaty which deals with the challenge to acts under Article 239 EC. 
Grounds may, however, exist for a challenge based on the fact that the UK's opt-out is 
unconstitutional as inconsistent with EC Treaty principles.'"' The potential divergence 
in the rights of British workers and workers elsewhere in the Community seems to be in 
conflict with the requirement of Article 6 EC that "any discrimination on grounds of 
nationality shall be prohibited'"*' and possibly also with the concept of citizenship as 
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See Gialdino, "Some Reflections on the Acquis Communautaire", (1995) 32 CML Rev, 1089-
1122. 
See Chapter 5. 
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Barnard, EC Employment Law, op cit, 67. 
European Parliament, Opinion of the Committee on Social Affairs, Employment and the Working 
Environment, op cit, at 69. 
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outlined in Article 8 EC*^ Alternatively, the UK's opt-out may distort EC competition 
policy''^ by putting the Member State signatories to the SPA at a competitive disadvantage 
in comparison to the UK."*"* 
Since the President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, was instrumental in the creation 
of the Social Chapter and in view of the responses of the Commission to Parliamentary 
questions'*^ it seems unlikely that such a challenge would emanate from the Community 
institutions. It seems more likely that a challenge would come from a third party 
employer or trade union, i f at all.''^ 
Irrespective of legal arguments, in practice it seems that the will of the actors'*^  involved 
may have prevailed.''^ The Council and Commission have replied to questions from the 
European Parliament stating that measures based on the SPA are regarded as part of 
Community law."*^  In addition the European Works Council Directive ^ °and the Directive 
on Parental Leave '^ have both been adopted without any challenge to their legal status or 
basis. Also on the basis of the SPA the Council has adopted a Resolution on certain 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
Gold, "Social Policy: The UK and Maastricht", op cit, at 100. 
Arts 85-94 E C . 
Barnard, "A Social Policy For Europe: Politicians 1:0 Lawyers", op cit, at 21 and Gold, "Social 
Policy: The UK and Maastricht", op cit, at 100. 
See above, note 25. 
Gold, "Social Policy: The UK and Maastricht", op cit, at 100. 
Blanpain & Engels, op cit, at 231 note that there is no doubt that the political will of the Member 
States was that the Agreement should belong to Community law. 
Falkner, op cit, at 2. 
OJ 1992 C 289/20,5 November 1992, OJ 1993 C 40/12, 15 February 1993 and OJ 1993 C 95/17, 
5 April 1993. 
Op cit. 
Council Directive 96/34/EC on the Framework Agreement on Parental Leave Concluded by 
UNICE, ETUC and CEEP, OJ 1996 L 145, 19 June 1996.. 
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aspects for a European Union Social Policy,'^ and the social dialogue procedure has been 
initiated on the subjects of part time and temporary workers,^ -' the burden of proof in the 
case of sex discrimination,^'' national information and consultation and sexual 
harassment,^ ^ again without challenge. 
The Legal Bases for Social Policy Action 
The Protocol notes that both it and the Agreement are "without prejudice" to the 
provisions of the EC Treaty." Community social policy is now "subject to two free 
standing, but complementary frames of reference".^ ^ Acts may therefore be proposed 
under either the EC Treaty or the SPA. 
Social policy action under the EC Treaty has been limited by its legal bases and voting 
requirements.^' Article 118 EC provides that the Commission shall have the task of 
"promoting close cooperation between Member States" in matters relating to, inter alia, 
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Council Resolution on Certain Aspects for a European Union Social Policy: A Contribution to 
Economic and Social Convergence in the Union, op cit. 
The first stage of consultations took place between 27 September and 8 November 1995 (see 
Agence Europe 6572, 28 September 1995, 15 and (1995) EIRR 262, 3). Negotiations on an 
agreement opened on 4 July 1996 (see Agence Europe 6754, 22 June 1996, 14 and Agence 
Europe 6763, 4 July 1996, 15). 
The first stage of consultations took place between 5 July and 16 August 1995 (see Agence 
Europe, 6516, 6 July 1995, 15). The second stage began on 7 February 1996 (see Agence Europe 
6662, 8 February 1996, 13). However, the social partners decided not to open negotiations on this 
subject because of the considerable divergence remaining between them (see Agence Europe 
6773, 18 July 1996, 13). The Commission has subsequently adopted a draft proposal for a 
Council Directive on the burden of proof in case of sex discrimination based on Art 2(2) SPA (see 
Midday Express, http://europa.eu.int, 18 July 1996). 
The first stage of consultation was initiated by the Communication From the Commission on 
Worker Information and Consultation, COM(95) 547 final, 14 November 1995, Part I, para 3. 
See also "Social Policy State of Play", (1996) 264 EIRR, 14-20, at 15. 
Agence Europe 6778, 26 July 1996, 8. 
Protocol, Preamble. 
Communication, ibid, para 8. 
Roberts, op cit, at 3. 
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employment, labour law and working conditions and the right of association and 
collective bargaining between employers and workers. However, the Commission's role 
does not involve the proposal of binding legislation in these areas.^ ^ 
A legal base is provided for the enactment of such Directives in Article 118a EC. Here 
directives are subject to qualified majority voting^' only, but are limited to "encouraging 
improvements, especially in the working environment, as regards the health and safety 
of workers".*^ Although Article 100a allows QMV for matters concerning the 
"approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action 
in Member States which have as their object the establishing and functioning of the 
internal market", Article 100a(2) states that this may not apply to "the rights and interests 
of employed persons". In industrial relations areas other than health and safety therefore, 
including the areas set out in Article 118 EC, the Commission has been forced to rely on 
Article 100 EC^^  which provides for "directives for the approximation of such laws, 
regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the 
establishment or functioning of the common market" and Article 235 EC^ which allows 
the Community to act where "necessary to attain... one of the objectives of the 
Community" where the Treaty has not provided such powers. However, action under 
both Articles 100 and 235 EC is restricted by the requirement of unanimity in Council." 
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Art 118 E C states that the role of the Commission is to "act in close contact with Member States 
by making studies, delivering opinions and arranging consultations..." See Roberts, ibid, at 3, who 
characterises the Commission as having a "liaison, consultation and promotional role..." 
Hereafter known as "QMV". 
Art 118a, para 1. Directives adopted on the basis of Art 118a E C include Council Directive 
89/391/EEC, OJ 1989 L 183/1, 12 June 1989 (Health and Safety) and the Directive 93/104, OJ 
1994 C 3-7/18, 23 November 1993 (Working Time). See also Case C-84/94, United Kingdom 
V Council of the Euuropean Union, judgment of 12 November 1996. 
Directives enacted on this basis include Council Directive 75/129, OJ 1975 L 48/29, 17 February 
1975 (Collective Redundancies); Council Directive 77/187, OJ 1977 L 61/27, 14 February 1977 
(Transfer of Undertakings) and Council Directive 80/987, OJ 1980 L 283/23, 20 October 1980 
(Insolvency). 
Art 235 E C was cited as a legal basis for Council Directive 86/378, OJ 1986 L 225/40, 24 July 
1986 (Equal Treatment in Occupational Social Security Schemes). 
For a review of the use of E C Treaty legal bases see Lo Faro, "EC Social Policy and 1993: The 
Dark Side of European Integration", (1992) 4 Comparative Labor Law Journal, 1-32. 
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Unlike Article 118a EC, Article 1 SPA notes that both "the Community and IVIember 
States shall implement measures." The objectives laid down in Article 1*^  are wider than 
those laid down in Article 118 EC, therefore allowing more scope for Community action. 
Article 2 lists the areas in which the Council may enact legislation in the social field. The 
Council may adopt Directives by QMV in the fields of "improvement in particular of the 
working environment to protect workers' health and safety,^ ^ working conditions, the 
information and consultation of workers, equality between men and women with regard 
to labour market opportunities and treatment at work (and) the integration of persons 
excluded from the labour market."^^ Al l of the above areas except health and safety 
provisions are restricted by the requirement of unanimity under the EC Treaty. Also, 
within the subject-matter covered, the scope of "working conditions" could prove 
particularly wide, potentially covering all areas of labour regulation except for those 
specified in Articles 2(3) and 2(6).^' 
Article 2(3) provides that unanimity is, however, required for action concerning "social 
security and social protection of workers, protection of workers where their employment 
contract is terminated, representation and collective defence of the interests of workers 
and employers, including co-determination,... conditions of employment for third-country 
nationals legally residing in Community territory (and) financial contributions for 
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Art 1 lists as objectives "the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, 
proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of human 
resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combatting of exclusion". 
The CEEP has expressed concern that the SPA may represent a regression in the standards of 
regulation applying to health and safety. While Art 118a E C referred to "harmonisation of 
conditions", Art 2 SPA merely requires the Community to "support and complement the activities 
of the Member States" (European Report 2016,15 February 1995. European Parliament, Opinion 
of the Committee on Social Affairs, Employment and the Working Environment, ibid, at 69 also 
regrets the abandonment of the concept of "levelling up". 
Art 2(1). 
Gold, "Social Policy: The UK and Maastricht", op cit, at 9, Lange, "Maastricht and the Social 
Protocol: Why Did They Do It?", op cit, at 10 and Opinion of Committee on Social Affairs, 
Employment and the Working Environment, op cit, at 69. Bercusson, "Maastricht: A 
Fundamental Change in European Labour Law", op cit, at 183, notes that the apparent overlap 
between the fields of competence may give rise to much debate as to the correct legal basis to be 
used when measures are proposed by the Commission. 
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promotion of employment and job creation...".™ Even taking into account this 
requirement of unanimity it seems that without the UK's veto there is potential for more 
action. Article 2(6) excludes from the scope of the SPA '^ action concerning "pay, the 
right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs."^^ 
These legal bases are expressly significantly wider than under the EC Treaty. However, 
given the political will of the Member State governments within the Council of Ministers, 
Article 100 EC could cover all the areas of potential action set out in Article 2 SPA. 
Since the Protocol notes that the SPA is "without prejudice.to the provisions of this 
Treaty"^^ (ie the EC Treaty) there seems to be no reason'''' why even the matters excluded 
from Article 2(6) could not be proposed under the EC Treaty. In this respect it could be 
argued that the legal competences set out in the SPA are, in fact, narrower than the EC 
Treaty which does not exclude these subjects from potential Community action.^ ^ 
It is, however, the enlarged use of QMV which may provide the greatest step forward 
under the SPA since it removes the power of veto of any one Member State. It may also 
raise the standards of social protection of measures adopted. Without the requirement for 
unanimity there is less need to make compromises which dilute the content of proposals 
to the lowest commonly accepted standard.''^  The Protocol specifies" that an amended 
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Art 2(3). 
However, see the view of Bercusson, European Labour Law, op cit, at 546-547 who states that 
exclusion of subjects under Art 2(6) from "this Article", ie Art 2, may mean that the competences 
are not excluded form Arts 3 and 4. 
European Parliament, Opinion of Committee on Social Affairs, Employment and the Working 
Environment, op cit, at 69 states that it is regrettable that fields as important as the right to strike 
and the right to remuneration have been excluded from the SPA. 
Protocol, Preamble. 
However, see Weiss, op cit, at 6, who argues that the Art 2(6) areas have been excluded 
completely from the competence of the Community. 
Davies, op cit, at 348. 
Roberts, "Industrial Relations and the European Community", op cit, at 3. 
Protocol, para 2. 
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version of the system for QMV to that laid down in Article 148(2) EC is to apply so as 
to take into consideration the UK's opt-out. The 10 votes allocated to the UK^^ have 
simply been subtracted from the equation, so that the required majority is 52 out of a total 
of 77 votes under the SPA.™ This means that a qualified majority now potentially 
corresponds to the support of only 6 out of the 14 Member States.^ '' The strength of the 
blocking minority required to reject a measure '^ may accelerate progress even in 
controversial areas. 
Without the presence of the UK it is more likely anyway that unanimous support may be 
found in many areas since 11 of the Member States have made at least a political 
commitment to strengthening social policy by signing the Social Charter.^ ^ However, the 
opinions of the 3 new accessions, Finland, Sweden and Austria, are not known.^^ In 
addition, since the British veto has been so predictable the true reservations of other 
Member States may have been discreetly hidden during previous negotiations on 
particular issues.^ '* QMV may yet, therefore, provide a useful tool for gaining agreement 
between the 14. 
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Barnard, EC Employment Law, op cit, at 68. 
Lo Faro, op cit, at 29. 
Kellner states that "without Britain playing the role of the licensed sceptic, there will be few, if 
any, occasions when that figure will be reached. The worried, poorer states - Spain, Portugal, 
Greece and Ireland - have a combined strength of only 21 votes: without Britain, they lack the 
muscle to block any measure the rest want to enact," in "Maastricht, Where Major Made His Big 
Mistake" The Independent, 13 December 1991. 
Without the agreement of the UK, the Social Charter took the form of a Solemn Declaration rather 
than a legally binding instrument. See, for example, Vogel-Polsky, "What Future is there for a 
Social Europe Following the Strasbourg Summit?", op cit. 
See Nielsen, Employers' Prerogatives, Copenhagen: Handelshojskolens Forlag, 1996. 
Teague, "Constitution or Regime?", op cit, at 317 and Whiteford, "W(h)ither Social Policy?", op 
cit, 114. 
39 
A More Ambitious PoUcy for Community Social Regulation? 
Without the possibility for the initiation of substantial social action, however, it is 
premature to talk of the possibiHty of large-scale adoption. Until now, initiatives have 
been dependent on the Commission's conception of the need for legislation in any 
particular area and of the nature of the subsequent proposal made to the Council. To 
some extent Article 4 relieves the Commission of this monopoly by creating the potential 
for the social partners to bargain independently on matters which later may be converted 
into binding European legislation.^^ However, UNICE has adopted a restrictive attitude, 
insisting that negotiations on Community level agreements should only follow a formal 
Commission initiative. 
This position reflects the minimalistic attitude of UNICE to the whole social dialogue 
process. As an organisation representing European employers, its interests in social 
policy are essentially negative, preferring free markets to inhibiting regulation.^^ In view 
of its previous consistent opinion that social matters should be left to national legislation 
and bargaining, the surprise agreement of UNICE to participate in the social dialogue^^ 
at all may have been more to do with a preference for an arrangement which they could 
directly influence rather than systematic legislation they could not.^' On the trade union 
side, however, there also seem to be reservations. The ETUC has indicated a preference 
for collective bargaining at the sectoral level, rather than interprofessional.^ It seems 
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Article 4(2) allows agreements between the social partners to be implemented by a Council 
decision on a proposal from the Commission. See Chapter 4. 
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Law and Labour Relations in Tomorrow's Social Europe", op cit, at 745. 
Agreement of October 31 1991, as set out in Annex 3 below. 
Streeck, op cit, at 170. 
"European Collective Bargaining - ETUC Strategy", ETUC, 1993. On this point see Hall, 
"Industrial Relations and the Social Dimension of European Integration", op cit, at 305. 
40 
unlikely for the present that the impetus for European regulation will originate from the 
social partners. 
The use of the SPA therefore depends to a large extent on a Commission initiative for 
binding legislation. The ambitious proposals for labour protection enunciated by the 11 
in the Social Charter '^ would suggest that, less restricted by the UK's veto, the 14 would 
be keen to pursue an intense policy of labour regulation under the SPA. However, it 
seems that the Commission's increasing concerns with the level of unemployment within 
the EC'^ have encouraged a focus more oriented towards competitiveness than a high 
level of employment protection. 
The Commission's Medium-Term Social Action Programme 1995-97'^  picks up the 
themes of the two White Papers which preceeded it, European Social Policy - A Way 
Forward for the Union^'^ and before that Growth, Competitiveness and Employment. 
Both of these White Papers highlighted the problems within the EC of high and persistent 
unemployment, low growth rates and increased competition from outside the Community. 
Attention was drawn to the need to develop a social policy which respected 
competitiveness and which took special account of the problems facing small and 
medium-sized enterprises.'^ The conclusions of the Essen summit'^ again focussed on 
the issue of unemployment, requesting the Employment and Social Affairs Council and 
the Commission to closely monitor Community employment trends. 
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Respecting these concerns the Social Action Programme for 1995-97 laid stress on the 
fact that the creation of jobs is "top priority" and that "a new balance must be achieved 
between the economic and social dimensions, in which they are treated as mutually 
reinforcing, rather than conflicting objectives''.^^ The practical consequences of this new 
"mutually enforcing" objective seems to be less and less binding regulation. 
The Action Programme itself set out few new binding legislative proposals in comparison 
with the Social Charter Action Programme'' which had proposed 17 new directives. The 
introduction observed that "there is at present less scope, or need, for a wide-ranging 
programme of new legislative proposals"."" Instead the Commission intends to increase 
its action in the areas of analysis and research and initiate a wide range of debates and 
studies on particular issues.'"' Non-binding solutions will also be found to the problems 
of homeworking, flexibility and work organisation and illegal work'°^ in the form of 
Recommendations, Communications and Green Papers. Only two brand new legislative 
initatives are proposed concerning the establishment of a general framework to protect 
individual rights acquired in occupational or supplementary pension schemes for migrant 
workers'"^ and on health and safety risks from explosive atmospherd^f Where the 
Action Programme did set out initiatives these were mostly concerned with unresolved 
issues, many dating back to the 1989 Social Charter Action Programme. 
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The SPA and the E C Treaty 
The proposal of action under the SPA invites the potential for regulation which affects 
only 14 Member States. Article 3(1) imposes upon the Commission "the task of 
promoting the consultation of management and labour at Community level". However, 
this obligation does not seem to have been interpreted as compelling the Commission to 
consider themselves primarily bound by the SPA, rather than Articles 117-121 EC.'°^ 
Instead the Commission has treated the SPA as an alternative legal base. 
Although it is clear that the SPA has been and will be made use of when necessary'"^ the 
Commission has shown some initial reservations about the proposal of action affecting 
only 14 Member States. There is obvious reluctance in the proposal of measures which 
advance the creation of a "two speed Europe" and which add to the anxiety concerning 
"social d u m p i n g " . T h e Commission White Paper, The Future of Social PolWy 
expressed the wish that standards should be developed "for all members of the Union" 
and the Commission's Communication confirms that one of the main considerations to 
be taken into account in deciding whether to initiate action under the SPA is "the 
possibility for all 12 [now 15] Member States to move forward together" under the EC 
Treaty.'"' 
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Weiss, op cit, 6 is of the opinion that Art 3(1) does impose such an obligation. Bercusson, "Social 
Policy at the Crossroads", op cit, 165 questions whether the social partners could challenge the 
legal basis of a Directive adopted under the E C Treaty rather than the SPA as unnecessarily 
excluding them. This may apply to the Directive on Posted Workers, recently adopted by 
qualified majority under the E C Treaty. See (1996) 545 IRLB, 16. 
"Although it is preferable to take decisions which are valid in all 12 [now 15] Member States, the 
procedure of the Social Protocol will be followed whenever necessary". Statement of Social 
Policy Priorities of the Belgian Presidency, (1993) EIRR 235, August 1993. See also Commission 
White Paper, European Social Policy -A Way Forward for the Union, op cit, in which the 
Commission argues that the desire for the UK's participation cannot be used as an excuse for 
standing still. 
"Maastricht and Social Policy - Part Two", op cit, at 24. On social dumping generally see 
Erickson and Kuruvilla, "Labor Costs and the Social Dumping Debate in the European Union", 
(1994) 48 Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 28-47. 
Op cit. 
Communication, para 8. 
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Padraig Flynn, Commissioner responsible for Social Affairs, has stated that the SPA will 
therefore be used as "an instrument of last resort"."" Until recently proposals for action 
have first been drawn up under the EC Treaty. Attempts to involve all Member States 
by basing social policy under the EC Treaty, in most cases requires unanimity in the 
Council.'" The presence of the UK ensures considerable compromise and lowering of 
standards of social protection in any measures adopted on this b a s i s . T h e European 
Parliament has indicated that it is unsatisfied with this arrangement since it would prefer 
"a good directive by 11 [now 14] countries to a bad one by 12 [now 15]""^ The Council 
Report on the Functioning of the Union has also revealed discontent."'' The proposal on 
the subject of part-time and temporary workers, for example, was reduced to a "bare 
bones minimum measure""^ in order to attempt to gain the agreement of the UK."^ 
Irrespective of the compromises that have to be made in the form of lowering of 
standards due to the requirement of unanimity under Article 100 EC and the presence of 
the UK in deliberations, it has seemed that action under the EC Treaty is to be preferred. 
Only when it has been made clear that any form of action was impossible as 15 has a 
second attempt been made at adoption by proposal of a similar measure under the SPA. 
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CBI conference on the future of E C Social Policy, 14 October 1993. See also Council Resolution 
on Certain Aspects for a European Union Social Policy: A Contribution to Economic and Social 
Convergence in the Union, op cit, para 12 and Commission Report for the Reflection Group, 
Intergovernmental Conference 1996, Luxembourg, 1995, at 48. 
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Agence Europe, 15 January 1994, 8. 
Council Report on the Functioning of the Union, SN 1821/95, 14 March 1995, point 41. 
Padraig Flynn, as quoted by Taylor, in "UK Blocks Part-Time Work Directive", Financial Times, 
7 December 1994. See also Agence Europe 6373, 8 December 1994, 15. 
European Report 475, 2 December 1994 notes that the German Presidency divided up the texts 
concerning part-time workers into Resolutions with derogatory clauses in order to the make them 
more palatable to the UK. See also "Portillo 'Trick' Astonished EU", Financial Times, 8 
December 1994. 
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While the present UK Conservative Government remain in office, however, it seems 
unlikely that agreement will be reached on social policy proposals"^ under the EC Treaty 
irrespective of the compromises made since the UK are opposed to extending the social 
dimension in principle, rather than opposed to specific directives or their specific 
substantive content. Measures rejected under the EC Treaty are then forwarded for 
proposal under the SPA. 
There are, however, signs that the Commission's "last resort" pohcy may be changing. 
Since the episode concerning the directive on part-time workers the Commission has 
referred matters under the SPA on a further two occasions. In the case of the first 
proposal, concerning national information and consultation of workers, the Commission 
has issued a Communication which serves to consult the EU institutions and the social 
partners for the purposes of the EC Treaty as well as signalling the start of the first 
consultation of the social partners under the SPA."^ In the case of the subsequent 
proposal on sexual harassment the Commission has been prepared to go further by 
proposing action solely and primarily on the basis of the SPA.'" 
However, since the proposal of acfion under the SPA does not affect all Member States 
and guarantees an opportunity for the social partners to conclude a collective agreement 
on the proposed subject, there may be issues which are better suited to adoption under the 
EC Treaty,additional to maintaining a coherent social policy within the Community. 
For example, in the case of the Directive on Posted Workers the Commission indicated 
that, i f agreement was impossible under the EC Treaty, it would be prepared to propose 
action under the SPA. This draft directive was aimed at ensuring that workers posted to 
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Except, perhaps, those concerning health and safety in the workplace. 
Communication from the Commission on Worker Information and Consultation, ibid. Part I, para 
3. See also "Social Policy State of Play", (1996) EIRR 264, 14-20, at 19. The UK Conservative 
government has since rejected outline proposals from the Commission on this subject. See Taylor 
and Parker, "Lang Rejects E U Proposal" Financial Times, 23 May 1996. 
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Cullen and Campbell, 'The Future of Social Policy-making in the European Union", in Craig and 
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another Member State were given the same rights within the host State as home workers. 
Since the main source of such workers is the United Kingdom, the adoption of a directive 
by only 14 Member States under the SPA would have avoided much of the problem.'^' 
The draft Directive on the burden of proof in the case of sex discrimination'^^ raised other 
problems. The directive addressed questions concerning the procedure of the Court of 
Justice, rather than issues which directly affected the day to day functioning of the 
members of the social partner organisations. Although the problem raised moral and 
social quesfions on which the social partner organisations should have been allowed to 
comment, it is arguable that such an issue was unsuitable as the subject of a collective 
agreement and hence a procedure should never have begun in which such an outcome 
was possible. 
Conclusion 
The SPA provides the opportunity for the 14 to adopt amongst themselves a substantial 
body of Community social law (or at least measures which may be treated as Community 
law). Although the social policy competences set out in the SPA are not substantively 
wider than those of the EC Treaty, the chance of their adoption is greater due to the 
absence of the UK from negotiafions. Since UNICE have made it clear that they are 
unwilling to negotiate on an agreement without the impetus of a Commission proposal, 
it seems that the Commission has in practice retained its monopoly over the regulatory 
initiative. The latest Social Action Programme has revealed that the Commission is 
hesitant about the proposal of large scale social action due to concerns over the high 
levels of unemployment within the Community. Many of the proposals it has made have 
concerned outstanding issues, previously rejected by the UK. Even where proposals have 
been made, preference has been shown for action by all Member States under the EC 
Treaty, rather than by the 14 under the SPA. 
'^' However, a qualified majority did in fact agree upon the draft Directive on Posted Workers. See 
(1996) 545 IRLB, 16. 
'^ ^ Agence Europe 6773, 18 July 1996, 13. 
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The Commission's policy seems to have been to use the SPA as a "clearing house", a 
mechanism to be used as a last resort by which to secure the adoption of the UK's 
rejected measures. However, this policy is open to criticism since it ensures a narrow use 
of the SPA based on the EC Treaty, ignoring the fact that Article 1 sets out fresh social 
policy objectives for the 14. I f the Commission were to adopt a more realistic attitude 
and accept the fact of the UK veto it could develop a more strategic social policy geared 
towards effective protection rather than possibilities for British acceptance.'^ ^ 
'^ ^ Hall, "Industrial Relations and the Social Dimension of European Integration", op cit, at 303. 
47 
Chapter 4 
CONSULTATION AND NEGOTIATION UNDER T H E SOCIAL 
P O L I C Y AGREEMENT 
Introduction 
Article 3 provides for a two-stage consultation procedure' with the social partners, the 
first stage on the "possible direction" of Community action and the second on "the 
content of the envisaged proposal". It is on the occasion of this second consultation 
procedure that the social partners may decide to begin negotiations under Article 4 in an 
attempt to conclude an agreement between themselves. This role potentially allows the 
social partners to exert great influence over the formulation of Community social 
legislation. 
The consultation procedure adopted in the SPA was based almost word for word on the 
October 1991 Agreement of the social partners^ However, when this agreement was 
concluded the UK opt-out had not been considered. The opt-out affects the nature and 
quality of the social dialogue and will impact on the probability of the conclusion of 
agreements and their content. This chapter aims to show that a meaningful consultation 
and negotiation process between the social partners may be jeopardised by the 
Commission's reaction to this opt-out. 
The Consultation Process 
Article 3(2) states that "before submitting proposals in the social policy field, the 
Commission shall consult management and labour on the possible direction of 
Community action". The Commission's Communication sets out clearly how this is to 
' See "Operational Chart Showing the Implementation of the Agreement on Social Policy", 
reproduced in Annex 4, below. 
^ See Annex 3, below. 
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occur. The consultation is initiated on receipt by each of the social partner organisations 
of a letter from the Commission outlining the proposed area for action. The parties then 
have six weeks within which to reply. Replies may be made individually by letter or, i f 
the social partners so desire, an ad hoc meeting may be convened for the discussion of 
these issues.-' 
In the light of comments received in this first consultation stage the Commission must 
then decide whether to proceed to the second phase in which the social partners are 
consulted on "the content of the envisaged proposal".'' The second phase of consultation 
is again initiated by the receipt of a letter from the Commission setting out the content 
of the planned proposal together with an indication of its possible legal basis.^  The 
duration of this second phase is also set at 6 weeks. The social partners should then 
deliver to the Commission in writing and where they so wish through the convening of 
an ad hoc meeting, an opinion setting the points of agreement and disagreement in their 
respective positions on the draft text.* 
The timing of the first stage of the consultation process, "before submitting proposals in 
the social policy field",'' implies that it was intended that the social partners contribute 
to the very earliest stages of policy-formation. The earlier in the process of development 
of a proposal the social partners can participate the greater their potential influence over 
the principles and theories on which the proposal is based. The October 1991 Agreement 
referred to consultation "on the possible guidelines" for Community action.^ Article 3(2) 
SPA refers to the "possible direction" of Community action. In its Opinion on the 
Communication, op cit, para 19. 
Art 3(3). 
Communication, op cit, para 19. 
Communication, ibid, para 19. 
Art 3(2). 
October 1991 Agreement, op cit, Art 118a(l). 
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Communication^ ECOSOC was concerned that this latter wording permitted several 
meanings, allowing the social partners greater or lesser influence: first, that no decision 
with regard to the broad issues contemplated had yet been taken by the Commission and 
that there were still alternatives to be canvassed, second, that the Commission had short-
listed several possible direcdons for Community action which the social partners were 
to discuss and third, that consultation was limited to a critique of the Commission's 
chosen direction for Community action. Reports indicate that in reality the first 
consultadon approximates to the third interpretation,'" offering the social partners the 
least possible influence. 
With regard to the second consultation document on the "content" of the envisaged 
proposal the Communication clearly contemplates that the content of these second 
documents should include a "draft text", "setting out the content of the planned proposal 
together with an indication of the possible legal basis"," to which the social partners can 
respond in the form of an opinion or, where appropriate, a recommendation.'^ 
Back to the Drawing Board? 
At present both consultation documents do, however, seem to represent something of a 
fiction. As has already been pointed out in Chapter 3, the issues thus far referred to the 
social partners have concerned subjects on which considerable Community attention has 
10 
11 
12 
CES(94) 1310, 24 November 1994, para 3.1.4. 
Agence Europe 6572,28 September 1995, 15 reports that on the issue of part-time and temporary 
workers the social partners were invited to comment on the Commission's views that part-timers 
should have the same rights as full-time workers. For reports on the consultation papers issued 
in the cases of the European Works Council Directive, parental leave, the burden of proof in the 
case of sex discrimination and national level information and consultation see (1994) 241 EIRR, 
3, Agence Europe, 22 February 1995 and Agence Europe 6516, 6 July 1995, 15, and 
Communication from the Commission on Worker Information and Consultation, op cit, 
respectively. 
Communication, op cit, para 19. 
Art 3(3) SPA. 
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already focussed,'^ in the form of legislative proposals which have not been adopted, 
largely due to the veto of the UK. These issues have therefore already been formulated 
into detailed legislative drafts for proposal under the EC Treaty. In addition the European 
Parliament will have been consulted under Article 235 EC and, for measures based on 
Articles 100 and 118a EC, this consultation requirement will have already extended to 
the social partners as part of ECOSOC. The Communication recognises the existence of 
such proposals and states that in the case that they are resubmitted under the legal basis 
of the SPA "the Commission will do everything possible... to ensure that work already 
done is being taken into account and thus to speed up the consultative process".' 14 
Irrespective of the timing of the first consultation document it may be impossible for the 
social partners to participate in the formulation of general theories and principles 
underlying any proposal which has already been composed in connection with previous 
submissions under legal bases in the EC Treaty. Similarly at the second consultation 
stage it may be difficult for the social partners to go back to the drawing board when a 
detailed legislative proposal already exists.'^ 
In the case of the European Works Council Directive,'* for example, the original 
proposal,'^ which was developed as part of the Social Charter Action Programme, was 
heavily debated and amended after Opinions by ECOSOC and the European Parliament'^  
before submission to the Council of 12 under Article 100 EC. It was against the 
background of this detailed proposal that the Social Partners were subsequently consulted 
on the "possible direction" of Community action, a seemingly impossible task 
14 
16 
17 
"Social Europe: A New Agenda", (1996) Labour Research, March, 23-25 and "Social Policy State 
of Play", (1995) EIRR, 26-30, at 29. 
Communication, op cit, para 8. 
This problem was compounded in the case of the discussions on parental leave since the second 
consultation document closely followed the draft compromise Directive drawn up by the Belgian 
Presidency in order to attract the vote of the UK. See (1995) 258 EIRR, 3 
Op cit. 
COM(90)581 final, OJ 1991 C 39, 15 December 1991. 
OJ 1991 C 336, 31 December 1991. 
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considering the already advanced state of existing documentation. Similarly previous 
failed EC Treaty proposals exist concerning parental leave,'' part-time and temporary 
workers^" the burden of proof in the case of sex discrimination^' and national information 
and consultation of workers.^ ^ Although no legislative proposals have been drawn up on 
the subject of sexual harassment, there exists at Community level a Commission 
Recommendation on the subject, which may have the same effect.^^ 
Padraig Flynn seems to have recognised the problem in the document submitted for 
consultafion under Article 3(2) on the subject of the Reconciliation of Working and 
Family Life.^'' In its texP the Commission sought to widen the area for discussion to 
take into account more than simply the issue of parental leave, as had previously been 
proposed. The suggestion was made that other issues such as schemes which take into 
account the needs of parents with children, the need for widespread child care 
arrangements and greater flexibility in the organisafion of work to allow men to 
participate in the family upbringing should be considered. However, the first consultation 
phase revealed that UNICE was not prepared to discuss anything other than the narrow 
issue of parental leave as originally proposed as action by all Member States.^ * 
Without a pre-existing formal legislative proposal the social partners would be able to 
start with a clean slate and therefore be able to contribute more effectively, especially 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
COM(84) 631 final. 
Proposal for a Council Directive on Certain Employment Relationships With Regard to Working 
Conditions, OJ 1990 C 224, 8 August 1990 and OJ 1990 C 305, 5 December 1990. 
Proposal for a Council Directive on the Burden of Proof in Sex Discrimination, COM(88) 269 
final, OJ 1988 C 176/5, 27 May 1988. 
Eg Proposed Fifth Directive on the Structure and Administration of Public Limited Companies, 
OJ 1972C 131. 
Commission Recommendation of 27 November 1991 on the Protection of the Dignity of Women 
and Men at Work, OJ 1992 L 49/1, 24 February 1992. 
SEC(95) 276. 
The contents of the text are outlined in Press note, IP/95/151, 22 February 1995. 
Interview with Ms Deborah France, International Social Affairs Group, CBI, 10 August 1995. 
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with regard to the first stage of consultation on the "possible direction" of Community 
policy. 
The Six Week Rule 
The Commission's Communication states that the first period of consultation should not 
last longer than 6 weeks.^ ^ The European social partner organisations are highly complex 
bodies comprising many national federations which in turn comprise many sectoral and 
regional affiliates. While recognising the need for a time limit in order to avoid delay, 
6 weeks seems to leave insufficient time for meaningful consultation with members.^ ^ 
The result of this restriction on time within UNICE was the need to start negotiations on 
parental leave in an ad hoc group before the first consultation document was released, 
basing negotiations on an approximation of its likely content considering previous Article 
100 EC initiatives.^^ While this seems the practical solution to the issue, it also 
exacerbates the problems associated with negotiations based on pre-existing EC Treaty 
proposals. The Commission has recentiy indicated that it intends to reconsider the time-
limit for the first stage of consultations. It has proposed the introduction of an adaptable 
time limit to be fixed on a case by case basis according to "the nature and complexity of 
the subject".^" However, whether the situation could be remedied by an extension of the 
time limit^' is dubious given the difficulties outiined above of disregarding existing 
proposals, irrespective of time. 
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Commission Communication, para 19. 
"Maastricht and Social Policy - Part 3", op cit, at 32. 
Interview with Ms Deborah France, International Social Affairs Group, CBI, 10 August 1995. 
Commission, Communication Concerning the Development of the Social Dialogue at Community 
Level, COM(96) 448 prov, 18 September 1996. 
ECOSOC has proposed that the time limit be increased to 8 weeks. See ECOSOC Opinion, at 
para 3.1.7. 
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From Consultation to Negotiation 
Article 3(4) states that "on the occasion of such consultation, management and labour 
may inform the Commission of their wish to initiate the process provided for in Article 
4". Article 4 allows the dialogue between the social partners to lead to "contractual 
relations, including agreements''.^ ^ While the reference in Article 3(4) to "such 
consultafion" may refer to the whole of the consultation process,^ ^ the Communication^'' 
suggests that it is envisaged that the social partners should initiate these negotiations 
during the second consultation stage.^ ^ 
Negotiations take as their starting point the document sent out as the second stage 
consultation document. The social partners are not restricted to the content of the 
proposal or merely to making amendments to it. However, it must be borne in mind that 
"Community action can clearly not go beyond the areas covered by the Commission's 
proposal",^* and that any action must take into account the SPA's protective provisions 
concerning small and medium-sized undertakings.^ ^ Excepting these requirements "such 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Note the view of Hepple, "European Social Dialogue - Alibi or Opportunity?", op cit, at 23, who 
is of the opinion that "contractual relations" is a translation of the French, "relations 
conventionelles", meaning relations based on agreement. He suggests therefore that legally 
binding collective agreements were only one of the methods of implementation envisaged under 
this phrase. 
See Bercusson, 'The Dynamic of European Labour Law After Maastricht", (1993) 23 ILJ, 1-31, 
at 20 and Bercusson, European Labour Law, ibid, at 540. 
Communication, Annex 4, Operational Chart Showing the Implementation of the Agreement on 
Social Policy, reproduced as Annex 3, below. 
Although it does not seem that earlier initiation of the Art 4 procedure is out of the question. See 
Bercusson, 'The Dynamic of European Labour Law After Maastricht", op cit, at 20 and ECOSOC 
Opinion, op cit, at para 4.1.2 who can see advantages in the social partners being able to initiate 
the Art 4 process at the first consultation stage. 
Communication, op cit, para 31. 
Art 2(2) states that directives adopted on the basis of Art 2(1) "shall avoid imposing 
administrative, financial and legal constraints in a way which would hold back the creation and 
development of small and medium-sized undertakings". The Communication confirms that 
"provisions regarding small and medium-sized undertakings referred to in Article 2(2) of the 
Agreement should be borne in mind by organisations which are signatory to the agreement". 
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agreement is entirely in the hands of the different organisations". 38 
In contrast with the elaborate checks and balances which apply to the legislative process, 
the manner in which the social partners are to conduct such bargaining and arrange voting 
procedures is not prescribed.^^ Although Article 3(1) requires the Commission to take 
any relevant measures to facilitate the dialogue, this would seem only to indicate 
administrative support and nothing as intrusive as rules of procedure.'"' 
The duration of the negotiations is set at nine months, unless the social partners and the 
Commission jointly decide to extend it."*' The Commission will consider a request for 
an extension on the basis of the probability that the social partners will arrive at an 
agreement and in doing so "wil l fully respect the social partners' independence".''^  The 
Commission's role was considered necessary in order to prevent the prolonging of futile 
negotiations or delaying tactics which would slow down the process of Community 
regulation.''^ However, it seems unlikely that the Commission would veto such an 
extension except where a request had been made after negotiations had obviously broken 
down."" 
The social partners have clearly indicated their wish that, once the Article 4 process has 
begun, then the Commission's work on parallel proposals for legislation should be 
38 
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Communication, op cit, para 31. 
Bercusson, European Labour Law, op cit, 540. 
Bercusson, "The Dynamic of European Labour Law After Maastricht", op cit, at 25. 
Art 3(4); Communication, op cit, para 32. 
Communication, ibid, para 32. 
Communication, ibid, para 32. 
Guery, "European Collective Bargaining and the Maastricht Treaty", (1992) 131 International 
Labour Review, 581-599, at 587. 
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suspended.''^  However the Communication does not refer to this issud* Suspension 
would, however, seem to be implied by the existence of the time limit''^ and the concern 
that the extension period should not allow futile negotiations "which would ultimately 
block the Commission's ability to regulate.'"'^  This does, however, raise the question as 
to whether legislative activities could resume in the case that negotiations irretrievably 
break down before the end of the nine month period or that negotiations do not begin at 
all. Although the issue is not dealt with in the Communication the concern with delay 
would also imply that such activities could resume.'" 
"Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law" 
Negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement occur after the second stage of 
consultation on the "content" of the envisaged proposal. In several articles concerning 
the SPA and social dialogue Brian Bercusson has characterised the negotiations following 
this second consultation as "bargaining in the shadow of the law".^° In his view the 
timing of the negotiations, after the Commission has presented its draft proposal within 
the second consultation document, means that the parties will be aware of the probable 
content of the legislation which would be enacted in the case of their failure to agree. 
The party less satisfied with the potential directive is therefore at a bargaining 
45 
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49 
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Proposals by the Social Partners for Implementation of the SPA, 29 October 1993, at para 10.1. 
Bercusson maintains that the Commission seems free to produce proposals after the initiation of 
the Article 4 procedure and even during it. In his opinion "it might even be that such a "twin-
track" process would impart a certain dynamism to both Commission and social partners". See 
Bercusson, "The Dynamic of European Labour Law After Maastricht," op cit, at 22; "Social 
Policy at the Crossroads", op cit, at 175; European Labour Law, op cit, at 542; Barnard, EC 
Employment Law, op cit, at 74 and Hepple, "European Social Dialogue - Alibi or Opportunity?", 
op cit, at 22. 
Guery, op cit, at 587; Fitzpatrick, op cit, at 205 and "Maastricht and Social Policy - Part 3," op 
cit, at 34. 
Communication, op cit, para 32. 
Guery, op cit, at 587. 
See Bercusson, European Labour Law, op cit, at 540-541; "Maastricht: a Fundamental Change 
in European Labour Law", op cit; 'The Dynamic of European Labour Law After Maastricht", op 
cit; "Social Policy at the Crossroads: European Labour Law After Maastricht", op cit and 
Bercusson and Van Dijk, op cit. 
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disadvantage, since it has more to lose i f negotiations break down. This "bargaining in 
the shadow of the law" has particular implications for the employers' associations, 
UNICE and CEEP, who broadly favour deregulation of the labour market and so are most 
likely in each case to be the less satisfied party. The incentive for employers' 
organisations to bargain increases the higher or more rigid the standard set by the 
Commission in the second consultation document. '^ If a high standard means a high level 
of protection for employees, the Commission document will similarly provide a 
disincentive for trade unions to bargain, or at least a minimum standard below which they 
are unlikely to agree. The information conveyed in this second consultation document 
is therefore of great importance. The less such a document presents detailed proposals, 
the greater the potential for the conclusion of an agreement since parties will not wish to 
risk reliance on the unknown.^^ Bercusson suggests that the potentiality for agreement 
may therefore be greater i f the Article 4 process could be initiated at the first stage of 
consultation, where the substantive content of the potential directive is a lesser known 
quantity.^^ 
Bargaining in the Shadow of Which "Law"? 
Bercusson's thesis rests on the fact that negotiations are centred on the draft as set out in 
the Commission's second consultation document. However, it has already been shown 
in Chapter 3, that many of the subjects so far referred to the social partners have been the 
subject of previous EC Treaty initiatives. It is submitted that discussions therefore begin 
from the starting point that failure to agree will almost certainly^"* result in the adoption 
of a Directive along the lines of these pre-existing proposals. This was made particularly 
clear before the dialogue began on the European Works Council Directive^^ where the 14 
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Bercusson, European Labour Law, ibid, at 541. 
Bercusson, "Maastricht: A Fundamental Change in European Labour Law", op cit, at 185. 
Bercusson, "Maastricht: A Fundamental Change in European Labour Law", ibid, at 185 and 
European Labour Law, op cit, at 540. 
Particularly in view of the increased potentiality for the use of QMV. See Chapter 3. 
Op cit. 
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went as far as to draw up a Common Position to be adopted i f no agreement was 
reached.^ ^ Although some trade offs may occur, any agreement is to a large extent likely 
to reflect the terms of these proposals, rather than any true consensus between the social 
partners based on the weapons of class struggle traditional to national level collective 
bargaining.^^ While it is suggested that "bargaining in the shadow of the law" is no less 
of a problem, it seems, however, that "the law" which may present the greatest difficulty 
in negotiations between the social partners is rather the pre-existing EC Treaty proposal. 
Reports indicate, in any case, that the Commission's second consultation document has 
had a tendency to reflect the Commission's own views as previously set out in these 
earlier proposals.^ ^ 
The Parental Leave Agreement 
The social dialogue has so far resulted in the formation of one agreement, on the subject 
of parental leave.This agreement may, however, be more significant for the fact that 
it has been concluded than for its substantive content.*" Existing national provisions on 
parental leave are, in most cases, superior to those set out in the agreement.*' The 
agreement itself to a large extent resembles previous EC Treaty proposals*^ and, where 
it does deviate from these, seems more restrictive. The agreement allows both men and 
women the right to take parental leave on the grounds of the birth or adoption of a child, 
to enable them to care for that child for at least 3 months up until the child is 8 years 
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Common Position 32/94, OJ 1994 C 244/4, 18 July 1994. 
Bercusson, European Labour Law, op cit, at 540. 
Europe, 2056, 8 July 1995, (1995) 258 EIRR, 3. 
See Proposal for a Council Directive on the Framework Agreement Concluded by UNICE, CEEP 
and the ETUC, COM(96) 26 final, 31 January 1996. 
(1995) 263 EIRR, 3. 
Except in Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg. See "Parental Leave in Europe", (1995) 262 EIRR, 
14-17. 
COM(83) 686 final, 24 November 1985, as amended by COM(84) 631 final, 15 November 1984. 
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old.*^ However, many important issues are left to be determined at the level of the 
Member State, for example the conditions for access to and income during*" parental 
leave.*^ 
The Agreement appears to have made significant sacrifices to the employers' 
associations.** With the spectre of the 1996 Intergovemmental Conference looming, the 
social partners may have felt a certain pressure to conclude an agreement as a justification 
of the new rights they have been given.*^ At the opening of the ETUC's 8th Congress, 
for example. Commission President Santer stated that the social partners "must show that 
the European constitutional legislator was right to trust them and give them considerable 
co-regulatory power".*^ This suggests that the chances of agreement look less sure for 
the subjects currently under discussion. 
Where No Agreement is Reached 
At or before the end of the 9 months the social partners must submit a report to the 
Commission.*' I f the report states that they are unable to reach an agreement then the 
Commission will examine whether a legislative instrument in the area would still be 
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However, the agreement states at Clause 2, point 1 that parental leave may be taken "until a given 
age of up to eight years to be defined by Member States and/or Social Partners" (my emphasis). 
It is unclear whether a Member State could set a low age limit, eg one year. 
Agence Europe 6603, 11 November 1995, 12 reports that the ETUC has subsequently requested 
Member States to take the necessary measures so that when the Agreement is implemented a 
minimum income is assured for all workers. 
(1995) 263 EIRR, 3. 
For example, clause 2, point 3 states that a Member State may "define the circumstances in which 
an employer... is allowed to postpone the granting of Parental Leave for justifiable reasons related 
to the operation of the undertaking (eg where the work is of a seasonal nature, where a 
replacement cannot be found within the notice period, where a significant proportion of the 
workforce applies for Parental Leave at the same time, where a specific function is of strategic 
importance)...". 
See Falkner, op cit, at 8. 
Agence Europe, 10 May 1995, 11 and European Report 2040, 10 May 1995. 
Communication, op cit, para 33. 
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appropriate.™ In this case the extent to which the advice received during the consultation 
process must be relied on or whether the Commission or Council may depart from it is 
unspecified.^' However in the case of the European Works Council Directive the 
Commission was not willing to make the suggested amendments of the European 
Parliament on the basis of the negotiations of the social partners.The status accorded 
to these negotiations, even where agreement could not be reached, is reflected by their 
being published as part of the Commission's final proposal for the directive. 
Conclusion 
The UK opt-out has important consequences for the consultation process. The existence 
of a pre-existing Commission proposal may make consultation on the "possible 
direction" and "content" of the proposed action difficult. It also creates the impression 
that the proposal has been "pre-cooked"^' by the Commission and that the social dialogue 
can only achieve minor adjustments to the text. During the negotiation process the 
existence of a pre-existing EC Treaty proposal exacerbates the problem of "bargaining 
in the shadow of the law". 
These problems may to some extent be relieved if the Commission were to treat the SPA 
as a legal basis of first resort, as it has done with regard to sexual harassment. The issues 
referred to the SPA so far have been "old chestnuts",^ '' outstanding after UK rejection and 
hence a first resort policy would have gained little. However, future use of this policy 
where the subject matter is new at Community level may improve the quality and 
efficiency of the social dialogue process. While the proposal for action on sexual 
harassment may signal a turning point in the Commission's policy, previous declarations 
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Communication, ibid, para 34. 
Whiteford, "Social Policy After Maastricht", op cit, at 209. 
Agence Europe, 6 May 1994, 11. 
Interview with Ms Deborah France, International Social Affairs Group, CBI, 10 August 1995. 
"Social Europe: A New Agenda", op cit, 24. 
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of its preference for action by all Member States seems to suggests that this latest referral 
is the exception and not the rule. In the long term the problem may only be resolved by 
putting an end the opt-out and introducing the SPA into the main body of the EC Treaty 
as an amendment to Articles 118, 118a and 118b. However, the UK Conservative 
Government remains "equally constant" on the issue: "The UK will not give up its opt-
out and cannot be forced to do so".^ ^ 
"A Partnership of Nations: The British Approach to the European Intergovernmental Conference 
1996", Cm 3181, HMSO, 1996. See also "The United Kingdom in Europe: People, Jobs and 
Progress", Department of Employment, September 1992. 
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Chapter 5 
IMPLEMENTATION OF MEASURES BASED ON THE SOCIAL 
P O L I C Y AGREEMENT 
Introduction 
The SPA envisages that measures resulting from the consultation and negotiation 
procedures may be "implemented' either in accordance with the procedures and practices 
specific to management and labour and the Member States or... by a Council decision on 
a proposal from the Commission". The method of implementation chosen defines the 
legal status of the text and of the rights and obhgations it sets out. Implementation has 
particular consequences for individuals who may wish to rely on national measures as a 
guarantee of their rights. This chapter will detail the methods of implementation in the 
context of their consequences for individuals asserting rights on the basis of legislation 
or agreements based on the SPA and evaluate such protection against the background of 
that accorded by social policy measures under the EC Treaty. 
Where There is No Agreement Under the Social Dialogue 
Where the social partners did not initiate negotiations under Article 4 or where no 
agreement was reached in these negotiations, the Commission "will look into the 
possibility of proposing, in the light of the work done, a legislative instrument".^ 
Proposed action on the basis of Article 2(1) must take the form of a directive. However, 
action under Article 2(3) does not seem to be so restricted. It may be that it was 
considered that action in the areas covered by Article 2(3) may lend itself to measures 
1 
The word "implementation" typically refers to the adoption at Member State level of regulation 
putting into practice the obligations set out in a Community level measure. Its use therefore seems 
somewhat misplaced with regard to the Council decision method which converts an agreement by 
the social partners into a Community measure for implementation at the level of the Member 
State. However, the language of the SPA will be maintained for the purposes of this chapter. 
Communication, op cit, para 34. 
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other than directives,' although the division of issues between Articles 2(1) and 2(3) 
rather seems to be motivated by voting procedures. 
It has been suggested above"* that it can be assumed that measures under the SPA may 
equate to their EC Treaty counterparts whether or not the SPA constitutes an amendment 
to the EC Treaty or an intergovernmental agreement. Directives may therefore be defined 
by Article 189 EC as measures "binding, as to the result to be achieved". As such, 
individuals may enforce their Community rights by reliance on national implementing 
measures. However, in the case of inadequate or non-implementation the Court of 
Justice has held that Directives may have vertical direct effect^ and that, where 
implementing measures exist, national courts must interpret national legislation as far as 
possible in the light of directives.* Where the precise meaning of the directive is unclear 
national courts may request an interpretative ruling under Article 177 EC at all stages of 
the judicial process. States may also be liable in certain cases for failure to implement 
a directive.^ National remedies must be proportionate? and effective,' with a deterrent 
7 
Action in the area of social security has previously taken the form of regulations, eg Council 
Regulation 1408 on the Application of Social Security Schemes to Employed Persons, to Self-
Employed persons and to Members of Their Families Moving Within the Community, OJ 1983 
L 230/6, 14 June 1971. 
See Chapter 3. 
That is, are directly effective against an "emanation of the state". See eg Case 41/74, Van Duyn 
V Home Office, [1974] ECR 1337 and Case 106/77, Simmenthal, [1978] ECR 629. 
Case 14/83, Von Colson, [1984] ECR 1891 and Case C-106/89, Marleasing, [1990] ECR 1-4135. 
Cases 6/90 and 9/90, Francovich and Bonifaci v Italian State, [1991] ECR 1-5357, Cases C-46/93 
and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur v Germany and R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Factortame [1996] ECR 1-1029, Case C-392/93, R v HM Treasury, ex parte British 
Telecommunications [1996] ECR 1-1631, Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-I89/94 and 
C-190/94, Dillenkofer and Others v Federal Republic of Germany, [1996] 3 CMLR 469 and Case 
C-5/94, R V Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas [1996] ECR 1-
2553. 
Eg Case 8/77, Sagulo, [1977] ECR 1495. 
Case C-213/89, R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p Factortame, [1990] ECR 1-2433 and 
Case C-271/91, Marshall v Southampton & South West Hampshire Area Health Authority, [ 1993] 
ECR 1-4367. 
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effect'" and be available at all stages of the judicial process." 
Article 2(4) explicitly recognises that implementation of SPA directives may be entrusted 
to national social partners, but obliges the Member State to "take any necessary measure 
enabling it at any time to be in a position to guarantee the results imposed by that 
directive."'^ This method of implementation and the obligation on Member States is not 
restricted to SPA directives, but has been recognised with regard to EC Treaty directives 
in the case law of the Court of Justice, the Social Charter'^ and in certain directives."* 
Although Article 189 EC allows a Member State to choose the "form and methods" of 
implementation of directives, it does not provide expressly for implementation by 
collective agreement. However, the Court of Justice held in Commission v Denmark^^ 
that in some cases collective agreements could be considered as one of these available 
"methods".'^ Member States may leave implementation to the representatives of 
management and labour "in the first instance", but this "does not, however, discharge 
them from the obligation of ensuring... that all workers in the Community are afforded 
the ful l protection provided for in the directive." Such an obligation allows Member 
States to delegate implementation to national social partners while maintaining ultimate 
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responsibility to " f i l l in the gaps" themselves.'^ 
The obligation on Member States created by Article 189 is one of result.Member 
States may tailor implementing measures to their own particular legal and social 
traditions'' as long as the principles set out in the Directive are complied with. The 
Conmiission's Communication states that "the Member State concerned must provide for 
procedures to deal... with any shortcomings in the agreement implementing the 
directive".^" In this respect acute problems arise due to the specific nature of collective 
agreements. First, any requirement to bargain on specific issues necessarily undermines 
the freedom of contract of the social partners and second, collective agreements are 
generally contracts legally binding only as between the contracting parties.^' Where 
Member States have maintained that directives have been fully implemented by pointing 
to existing national collective agreements the Court has, therefore, been particularly 
concerned that agreements should fully guarantee both the substantive content of the 
directive^^ and that they should cover all workers, including non-union members.^ -' 
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At the heart of this concern is the effective judicial protection of the individual whose 
rights are affected by the substance of the directive's obligations.^'' The Court stated in 
Commission v Germany^^ that implementation of a directive affecting the rights of an 
individual must guarantee that their "legal position... is sufficiently precise and clear and 
the persons concerned are made fully aware of their rights and, where appropriate, 
afforded the possibility of relying on them before national courts."^^ It is not enough that 
Community obhgations are fulfilled in practice:^'' the implementing measure must also 
be legally binding. Thus, in Commission v Belgium^^ the Court considered that a 
collective agreement which had been extended by Royal Decree was adequate 
implementation of the collective redundancies directive.^' 
This concern for the protection of the individual is also the impetus for the Article 2(4) 
obligation on Member States. The Communication explains that the purpose of this 
obligation is "to ensure that the workers concerned are in practice afforded their rights 
under the directive".^" As argued above, in both the case that the SPA is part of the EC 
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Treaty and i f it is instead an intergovernmental agreement which "borrows" the principles 
enunciated in the Treaty, an individual may rely on the above case law as protection of 
their rights. 
The European Works Council Directive was the first directive adopted on the basis of the 
SPA. The majority of Member States affected have proposed binding legislation as 
implementation of the directive.^' However, implementation under the Article 2(4) 
method has been considered in Norway and Belgium.^^ In Norway an agreement on the 
directive was reached in November 1995 between the LO trade union confederation and 
the NHO employers organisation. Subject to formal ratification by the governing bodies 
of the two associations the agreement will come into force on 22 September 1996. In 
Belgium the social partners are considering draft legislation within the National Labour 
Council. I f an agreement is reached it will be given the force of law by a Royal Decree. 
Implementation of Community Level Agreements 
Community level agreements may be implemented either "in accordance with the 
procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the Member States" or 
"by a Council decision on a proposal from the Commission."" The choice is left to the 
discretion of the social partners as part of the consultation process. The method chosen 
may depend on several factors, including the subject matter of the proposal. '^' It seems, 
for example, that agreements which contain specific rights for workers may be more 
suited to implementation by a Council decision which would give the agreement the force 
of Community law. However, broadly drafted agreements which to a greater extent lay 
down general policies may be better accommodated by a collective agreement which can 
reinterpreted at lower levels according to national law and practice. 
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Implementation by Council Decision 
In matters covered by Article 2, the social partners may jointly request that the agreement 
be implemented by a Council decision. Implementation by this method does not seem 
to be restricted to agreements deriving from a Commission proposal. Any agreement 
which falls into the Article 2 subject matter may therefore be requested to be converted 
into a Council decision. 
Considerable discussion has centred on whether the Commission or Council can 
reformulate the agreement at this stage.^ ^ This confusion arises out of the discrepancy 
between the wording of the October 1991 Agreement^ ^ and Article 4(2). While the social 
partners text refers to "agreements as they have been concluded' (my emphasis). Article 
4(2) remains unequivocal, suggesting that the possibility of Commission intervention 
remains open. Any amendments seem likely to damage relations with the social partners 
by infringing on their autonomy and converting their role into one of formation of 
proposals (ie more like lobbying), both of which are contrary to the Commission's task 
of "promoting the consultation of management and labour at Community level". 
However, the Communication confirms that the Commission sees no opportunity for 
amendment.^' The Council decision converting the Parental leave Agreement was 
limited to making binding the provisions of the agreement as concluded. In deference to 
this commitment, the text of the agreement did not form part of the decision, but was 
annexed to it. 
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Despite there being a legal basis for the conclusion of Community-level agreements in 
Article 4(1), their legal status is left uncertain. Article 4(1) refers to "contractual 
relations, including agreements", suggesting that they are binding merely as contracts 
between the parties to the agreement.'"' The purpose of offering the option for 
implementation by Council decision seems to be to give general legal effect to an 
agreement'" and to provide a mechanism for extending coverage to those workers who 
are not represented by the social partners, ie to create a European-level erga omnes 
procedure.''^ 
The reference to the term "Council decision" has, however, created some ambiguity 
concerning the measures available for transposition of the agreement.''^  "Decision" has 
a technical meaning under Article 189 EC as a Community act which is "binding in its 
entirety on those to whom it is addressed". In addition decisions must "state the reasons 
on which they are based"'''' and "shall be notified to those to whom they are addressed".''^  
A decision by this definition and addressed to the 14 Member States would give binding 
legal effect to the agreement and function in a manner comparable with the extension 
procedures operational in several Member States for ensuring that national collective 
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agreements are binding erga omnes^^ Although Article 189 EC does not describe 
decisions as directiy applicable, as it does regulations, the case law of the Court of Justice 
has confirmed that they may be directly effective,'*' i f the criteria for direct effect are 
satisfied.'** Since EC Treaty decisions may give rise to these binding obligations they are 
usually expressed in unconditional and precise language. Such a measure seems unsuited 
to the general legislative function that implementation of an agreement would entail'" and 
calls into question whether further implementation at national level would be required, 
as is the case for Directives. In implementing decisions at national level nor would it be 
open to Member States to entrust implementation to the social partners under Article 2(4) 
since it refers only to directives. 
However, the Danish, Dutch and German translations of the SPA use terms 
approximating to "arriving at a decision"^" which suggests that the decision may refer to 
the discretion enjoyed by the Council either in choosing an appropriate instrument^' or 
not to implement the agreement at all. The Commission's Communication seems to 
reflect this interpretation, stating that the Commission shall "propose that the Council 
adopt a decision on implementation" (my emphasis).^ ^ This interpretation does not 
restrict implementation to a Council decision as defined by Article 189 EC. 
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The proposal arising from the agreement between the social partners on parental leave 
has confirmed that the Commission has favoured the latter interpretation, proposing the 
adoption of a directive, the measure most commonly used for European industrial 
relations legislation and well suited to a general legislative function. A directive is 
defined by Article 189 EC as a Community act which is "binding as to the result to be 
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods". A directive is also therefore a suitable 
means of implementation of "framework agreements" which are "intended to be applied 
indirectly by means of provisions to be transposed into national law by the Member 
States or the social partners".The explanatory memorandum accompanying the 
proposal on Parental Leave states that "the term "decision"...refers to one of the binding 
legislative instruments under Article 189..." '^' Implementation may occur by directives, 
regulations or decisions, but not by means of opinions or recommendations which have 
no binding force. The proposal goes on to state that "it is up to the Commission to 
propose to the Council the most appropriate of the three binding instruments under the 
said article".^' It is unclear, though, why the Commission and not the social partners 
should make this choice. 
In the case of implementation by "Council decision", therefore, the degree of protection 
accorded to the individual will depend on the measure chosen to implement the 
agreement by the Council, which will in most cases, it is suggested, be a Directive. If so, 
the individual will be able to rely on the protection of a legally binding national 
implementing measure and the Member State will be required to provide adequate 
remedies in the case of any breach. Where the national measure is inadequate the 
individual has the possibility of reference to the precise terms of the Community level 
agreement, as implemented by the Directive, through the remedies of direct effect. 
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indirect effect and the possibility of state liability under Francovich. In addition the 
Commission may be willing to bring an action against the Member State for non-
implementation under Article 169 EC. 
Implementation may not, however, be a foregone conclusion. The Commission's 
Communication states that "by virtue of its role as guardian of the Treaties" the 
Commission may decide not to present the agreement as a proposal to the Council.^'' This 
decision follows consideration of the representative status of the contracting parties, their 
mandate, the legality of each clause in relation to Community law and the existence of 
provisions relating to the protection of small and medium sized undertakings, the 
conclusions of which take the form of an explanatory memorandum to any resulting 
proposal.^ * If it decides not to forward the proposal to the Council, the Commission will 
immediately inform the signatory parties of the reasons for its decision.^' However, the 
basis for this discretion and assessment is questionable since nowhere in the SPA is it 
suggested that the Commission may refuse the social partners' request for 
implementation by Council decision.*" 
It is, on the other hand, open to the Council to decide not to implement the agreement by 
rejecting the Commission's proposal. The Council is to act by QMV except where the 
agreement contains one or more provisions relating to one of the areas referred to in 
Article 2(3), in which case it must act unanimously.*' If rejected the Commission will 
withdraw its proposal and "examine, in the hght of the work done, whether a legislative 
instrument in the area in question would be appropriate."*^ Where the Commission 
concludes that legislation is appropriate it may present a new proposal of its own. 
However, in view of the Commission's Article 3(1) commitment to promote the social 
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dialogue, it seems that it should be prepared to enter into negotiations with the 
contracting parties in order to introduce alterations into the agreement which may gain 
the relevant Council approval. 
Implementation by the "Voluntary Route" 
Article 4(2) states that agreements may also be implemented "in accordance with the 
procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the Member States" and 
has been dubbed by the Communication as the "voluntary route" In contrast with 
implementation by a Council decision, which only applies to matters covered by Article 
2, this second method seems to apply to any Community-level agreement, whether or not 
it falls within the legal bases of the Community Treaties. 
The Declaration on Article 4(2)^ attached to the SPA states that this method of 
implementation "wil l consist in developing, by collective bargaining according to the 
rules of each Member State, the content of the agreements." It therefore relies on the 
incorporation of agreements by existing national level collective bargaining structures. 
It is from this national structure that the substance of the European agreement will gain 
its legal status and on which individuals can enforce their rights.*^ The Communication 
states that "the terms of this agreement will bind their [the social partners'] members and 
will affect them only in accordance with the practices and procedures specific to them in 
their respective Member States."^^ 
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This procedure for implementation does not directly involve any action by the 
Community institutions. The Social Partners Proposals for implementation of the SPA 
state that, "in this case the Community institutions should refrain from intervening in the 
area covered by the agreement in question or its application."*' This wording is not 
repeated in the Communication.** It is uncertain therefore whether the Community is 
able to take further action in the same area once implementation has occurred. Although 
no mention is made in the Communication of this possibility, it seems unlikely that future 
Community action would be ruled out. Presumably the Commission would be free to 
make further proposals, on which the social partners would be again consulted and given 
the opportunity to conclude an agreement. 
This second method of implementation seems to presume that national level bargaining 
will take place. However, national industrial relations systems do not generally impose 
obligations to bargain on national level social partner organisations.*' Neither the ETUC, 
CEEP or UNICE have mandates to bargain on behalf of their national members who, in 
turn, may not have mandates to bargain on behalf of their individual members.™ The 
signatures of European social partner organisations therefore create "at most a moral 
obligation" for national bodies to implement European agreements." Even considering 
that this moral obligation to bargain is respected, there is no guarantee that the national 
social partners negotiations will result in agreement. The Declaration refers to 
"developing... the content of the agreements..." rather than of mere implementation, 
implying that the national social partners may take an activist stance on the issues to be 
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discussed.However it seems that the obligations laid down in the European-level 
agreement must serve as minimum requirements. In the case that agreement does result, 
differences between the 14 national industrial relations systems are such that collective 
agreements would have differing legal status and enforcement procedures, creating 
unequal rights across the Community." 
In addition, national collective agreements, prima facie, only bind their signatory parties, 
the members of trade unions and employers associations. There is a wide divergence in 
membership, in particular of trade unions as between Member States.^ '' Although some 
Member States have national extension procedures whereby collective agreements can 
be given erga omnes effect,''^ they differ in scope and effectiveness and are insufficient 
to guarantee rights for anywhere near all workers. 
The wording of Article 4(2), which states that "agreements concluded at Community 
level shall be implemented in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to 
management and labour and the Member States", seems to suggest that some obligation 
on Member States to implement may persist. This wording may be significant in that it 
follows that of the first draft of the SPA by the Dutch Presidency and is one of the few 
departures from the precise terms of the October 1991 Agreement which stated that 
agreements ''may be realised..."^^ 
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Bercusson, European Labour Law, op cit, at 545 states that "developing" is not necessarily 
implicit in the implementation process, but goes beyond it. 
In Italy and Germany, for example, the binding effect of the collective agreement differs as its 
obligatory and normative elements. 
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The precise terms of this obligation are not, however, clear and are not clarified by the 
Communication. Three interpretations can be suggested.'* First, Member States may be 
obliged to develop particular formal procedures and practices to facilitate 
implementation. Member States may, for example, be forced to create erga omnes 
extension procedures where none exist. Second, the obligation may only extend to a 
requirement that Member States use machinery which is already in existence at national 
level, for example, in Member States where extension procedures are already available 
they must be used. Finally the obligation may be capable of a more negative 
interpretation. The requirement on Member States may merely extend to a principle of 
non-interference by national authorities with existing mechanisms or those set up by 
national social partners for the transposition of European agreements into national level 
agreements. 
Any positive obligation seems to be denied'^ by the Declaration which states that "this 
arrangement implies no obligation on the Member States to apply the agreements directly 
or to work out rules for their transposition, nor any obligation to amend national 
legislation in force to facilitate their implementation". In contrast to the implementation 
of directives under Article 2(4) and as determined by the case law of the Court of Justice, 
the implementation of European-level agreements by what the Communication terms the 
"voluntary route"*" seems to involve no obligation on the state to "guarantee the results 
imposed". Neither does there seem to be an obligation for States to amend legislation 
contrary to the terms of the agreement,*' nor to provide adequate remedies for any breach. 
It should be borne in mind, however, that the strict requirements of Article 2(4) and the 
case law of the Court of Justice reflect the fact that where the implementation of 
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directives is concerned Member States may choose to use collective agreements, but the 
primary method of implementation is assumed to be binding legislation. The same 
standards applied to Member States in the implementation of agreements by the 
"voluntary" method would require erga omnes extension procedures to be used in all 
cases and to be set up at national level where they did not previously exist. 
The Declaration does not, however, rule out the third possible meaning of the obligation 
in Article 4(2). The denial of positive obligations to take action to facilitate 
implementation of collective agreements does not rule out a negative interpretation, that 
Member States may not construct barriers to such implementation.^^ Neither does the 
Declaration prevent Member States from facilitating the implementation of collective 
agreements. The system may therefore be reliant on the goodwill of Member States to 
ensure that their workers are sufficiently protected. 
The "voluntary route" has a particular impact on the possibilities for individual remedies 
in the case of non-implementation of an agreement. The probable contractual status of 
the European-level agreement means that it may be of little remedial use as the European 
social partner organisations may be the only parties able to sue where the contract has 
been breached.^ "* Bearing in mind their lack of bargaining mandate, neither may the 
European social partners sue their national affiliated organisations on the basis of 
inadequate or non-implementation. Nor could an individual refer to the European 
agreement in the context of direct effect, indirect effect, a claim under Francovich or 
even persuade the Commission to bring an action for non-implementation under Article 
169 EC, since the Member State has declined responsibility for implementation under the 
Declaration. With respect to the possibility that the Court of Justice may interpret 
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agreements under Article 177 EC there also seems to be doubt.*^ In the implementation 
of European level agreements by the "voluntary route" the SPA makes no distinction as 
between agreements falling within the substantive legal bases of Article 2 SPA and those 
containing provisions which do not. It seems inconceivable that the Court should be 
asked to interpret an agreement which may have no legal basis in European law. 
Conclusion 
We are left with the anomalous situation whereby, irrespective of the content of a social 
policy measure, both the possibility of agreement between the social partners and their 
choice of implementation method is instrumental in defining the protection afforded to 
the individual. Where no agreement can be reached and a directive is instead adopted, 
the individual has the protection of a legally binding national measure, whether in the 
shape of national legislation or "Member State guaranteed" national collective 
agreements under Article 2(4), as well as the possibility of being able to rely on the 
directive through direct effect, indirect effect and the possibility of a claim against the 
State for damages under Francovich. Where an agreement is reached and the "Council 
decision" method chosen by the social partners, the individual may rely on similar 
protection in the case of implementation at European level by a directive. However, as 
concerns implementation by the "procedures and practices" method, an individual may 
only refer to the national implementing collective agreement according to the rules of the 
Member State, but has no means of redress where this national agreement does not accord 
with the European agreement or where national affiliates to the European social partner 
organisations refuse to implement or cannot agree on the subject matter of the European 
agreement. As an example of deference to the principle of subsidiarity** such 
implementation is to be applauded. The Declaration does not oblige Member States to 
interfere with national industrial relations systems through the compulsory creation of 
erga omnes extension procedures. 
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However, such a lacuna in the protection of individuals may not be altogether surprising 
or, indeed, harmful. The experience of the European Works Council Directive and the 
pre-Maastricht "Val Duchesse" social dialogue" has revealed the difficulties associated 
with gaining any form of agreement between the social partners. The Val Duchesse 
dialogue resulted in several "joint opinions" of no particular legal status, on the 
co-operative growth strategy for employment^* and concerning training and motivation, 
and information and consultation.^^ Several other joint opinions have subsequently been 
reached. These opinions have largely been wide policy statements, rather than precise 
documents which could be translated into binding legal form. It is this type of agreement 
which is apt to be implemented by the "procedures and practices" method. Such 
agreements could play a valuable role in the co-ordination of national practice and policy 
in specific areas and prepare the groundwork for future binding Community action as 
well as improving the dialogue with and awareness of national organisations of 
Community issues, while leaving the implementation of agreements conceming the rights 
of individuals to binding "Council decisions". 
The SPA therefore allows the social partners the potential to determine the form as well 
as the substance^ of Community social action. The way this discretion will be exercised 
in practice is dependent on the personalities involved in the dialogue. Exactly who the 
social partners are will therefore be examined in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
WHO A R E THE SOCIAL PARTNERS? 
Introduction 
Articles 3 and 4 refer to the consultation of and the dialogue between "management and 
labour". Similarly, Article 2(4) allows a Member State to entrust the implementation of 
directives to "management and labour". However, nowhere in the Social Policy 
Agreement or elsewhere in the EC Treaty is this concept of "management and labour" 
explained or defined. The Val Duchesse social dialogue involved only representatives 
of the ETUC, CEEP and UNICE. However, following the adoption of the Social 
Chapter, a number of other organisations requested that the Commission consider their 
direct participation in the SPA social dialogue.' 
The Social Partners Study 
With a view to the implementation of the SPA the Commission engaged in a study of 
European level trade unions and employers' associations early in 1993, the results of 
which were published on 24 August of that year.^  Although the SPA gives no indication 
of the criteria to be used in order to determine the identity of "management and labour", 
the Commission seems to have focussed on the issue of representativeness.^ This issue 
is inextricably bound up with the concept of democracy'' and suggests that the 
Commission placed importance on the new SPA social dialogue as a democratic process, 
rather than, say, as a process of invited contributions by expert advisers who do not 
Communication, op cit, para 23. 
Commission, Social Partners Study, Doc V/614/93/E, 24 August 1993. 
See Social Partners Study, op cit, Annex 1,1. The significance accorded to the principle of 
representativeness is also reflected by the title to Annex 3 of the Communication, "Main Findings 
of the Social Partners Study (Representativeness)". 
The issue of "Democracy and the Social Dialogue" will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
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necessarily reflect the views of the majority. The concept of representativeness is not one 
which has been defined at European level. The Social Partners Study therefore posed the 
question as to how the concept has been defined by the laws of the Member States in 
order to assist the Commission in assessing how this condition might best be satisfied at 
European level.^ 
The study was based on reports submitted by independent experts from each Member 
State, including the UK, despite the opt-out. The reports ascertained the national level 
requirements of representativeness necessary for social partner organisations to take part 
in both national formal consultations and collective bargaining and identified the 
resulting participants. In addition the reports presented "individual fact sheets" 
containing quantitative and qualitative information with respect to the operation and 
national affiliations of 12 European level organisations. 
hi looking to the traditions of the Member States for the basis of the definition of 
representativeness at Community level the Commission followed Community practice 
with respect to the development of general principles of law.^ However, this 
methodology may not be entirely suited to the case in point. The ECOSOC Opinion on 
the Communication states that "consultation and social dialogue at EC level should not 
be assumed to be the same as collective bargaining within Member States. The processes 
and outcomes may be different... It is important not simply to extrapolate from national 
experience to EC level".' While the outcome of a collective agreement at Member State 
level is in most cases a legally binding contract^ between the parties in agreement, it may 
have rather more significance within the SPA social dialogue since its content may be 
Communication, op cit, para 23. 
See, in particular Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission, [1974] ECR 
1063 where the Advocate General engaged in a study of national practice. See also Cases C-46/93 
and C-48/93, Factortame No 3, op cit. 
ECOSOC Opinion, op cit, para 2.1.3. 
Except in the UK. 
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implemented as law by a Council decision binding on the whole of the Community.^ The 
criteria for representativeness may therefore need to be more stringent in this latter case. 
The laws of several Member States allow for similar national erga omnes extension 
procedures.'" However, these were not singled out or focussed on within the Social 
Partners Study. In addition, the question of representativeness within national law has 
been defined over time within the particular national social and economic traditions. A 
survey which looks at the single issue of representativeness in isolation may not reflect 
these traditions. 
The results of the Social Partners Study can be divided into 3 separate sections, each of 
which will be examined in turn. 
Recognition for the purposes of Collective Bargaining 
The first question asked to the national level experts looked at the systems for recognition 
of national social partners for the purposes of collective bargaining." The basic 
mechanism was found to be mutual recognition, although several Member States require 
that additional formal or legal requirements be fulfilled. Before collective bargaining can 
begin in Ireland, for example, trade unions and employers associations are required to 
obtain a negotiating license and in Belgium the social partners need government 
recognition. Similarly the Portuguese system requires registration of both sides of 
industry by the Ministry of Labour and in Luxembourg trade unions need to be classed 
as representative at national level. In Greece, however, although no prior recognition is 
mandated, where one of the parties does not meet the quantitative criteria laid down by 
law the collective agreement can be declared null and void. Similarly the German system 
allows formal recognition to be sought in the State courts where the representativeness 
of a trade union is contested. In Spain, however, although no formal recognition is 
9 
10 
Art 4(2). 
Belgium, Germany, France, Spain and the Netherlands. 
Social Partners Study, Annex 3 reproduces the detailed answers of each national expert. A 
summary of the results is contained in Annex 1,5. 
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required for agreements binding as between the contracting parties, trade unions which 
are deemed to be the "most representative" organisations have the right to negotiate 
collective agreements which can be extended erga omnes. 
Where additional requirements are mandated these are both quantitative and qualitative 
and vary considerably. In Germany the financial and physical resources of the association 
and in France the experience and period of functioning of the organisation are relevant 
factors. Alternatively the social partners in Ireland must deposit 20,000-60,000 punts 
according to the size of the organisation. However, in virtually all cases some form of 
proof of representativeness is required, although the test is not always explicit. In the 
case of trade unions the number of members of the organisation in many cases plays a key 
role in recognition, whether as a general consideration, as in Germany, or by a set 
minimum membership figure, which ranges from 1,000 in Ireland to 50,000 in Belgium 
or by a proportionate figure, as in Luxembourg where trade unions need to prove that they 
represent more than 2% of organised workers. However other Member States, for 
example Belgium, also take into account the geographic, all-industry and inter-sectoral 
scope of organisations. 
Employers associations are, as a rule, recognised using the same or similar criteria as for 
the trade unions, for example as in Belgium and Ireland. In several cases, however, such 
as Greece and Spain, the quantitative requirements attach to the number of workers 
employed by the affiliated companies rather than the number of company members of the 
organisation. Exceptionally, there are no rules for the recognition of employers 
associations in Luxembourg since each sector of the Luxembourg economy is represented 
by one single employers organisation. 
Recognition for the Purposes of Formal Consultation 
The Social Partners Study revealed'^ that most Member States have some kind of formal 
consultation body, usually taking the form of a council dealing with economic and social 
Social Partners Study, op cit, Annex 3 and Annex 1, 6. 
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issues, although Greece and Italy are exceptions, the former because no such body exists 
and the latter because it engages in informal consultations. In most cases the membership 
of these bodies is allocated by administrative decision based on traditional practice taking 
into account the size and influence of the largest umbrella organisations. Some Member 
State councils, such as Denmark, include sectoral as well as intersectoral organisations. 
However, in the majority of cases membership was accorded to associations which were 
in turn affiliated to either the ETUC or UNICE. 
Examination of the Federations 
The Commission initially examined 12 European federations, comprising 3 employees' 
and 9 employers' organisations,''* chosen due to their "clear vocation to represent the 
interests of their members as either employers or trade union organisations" or because 
such organisations had made specific requests to be included in the definition of 
"management and labour" for the purposes of the social dialogue.'^ However, the 
Commission was keen to point out that the inclusion or not of organisations within the 
study would not be determinant of their classification as a social partner.'* 
The results of the Commission's research is contained in Annex 2 of the Social Partners 
Study. For each organisation chosen the survey examined its quantitative membership, 
involvement in collective bargaining, consultative role, whether or not the organisation 
directiy participates in annual meetings of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
and whether it is represented in existing EC consultative bodies. It therefore involved 
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ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation), C E C (Confederation Europeenne des Cadres), 
CESI (Confederation Europeenne des Syndicats Independents). 
UNICE (Union des Confederations de ITndustries des Employeurs d'Europe), CEEP (Centre 
Europeen des Entreprises a Participation Publique), UEAPME (Union Europeenne de I'Artisanaat 
et des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises), EUROPMI (Comite Europeen de la Petite et Moyenne 
Entreprise Independente), EMSU (Europaische Mittelstands-Union), AECM (Association 
Europeenne des Classes Moyennes), CEDI (Confederation Europeenne des Independents), 
EUROCOMMERCE (Retail, Wholesale and International Trade Representation to the EC) and 
ECWITA (European Community Wholesalers and International Traders Association). 
Social Partners Study, op cit, Annex 1, 2. 
Social Partners Study, ibid, Annex 2, 1. 
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consideration of quantitative and quahtative criteria as well as taking into account 
previous practice within the EC and internationally, an extension of the previous focus 
on representativeness. 
Conclusions 
The conclusions of the study are summarised in Annex 3 of the Communication.With 
respect to recognition for the purposes of collective bargaining the conclusions refer to 
the wide diversity as between the Member States and go on to say that "it is difficult to 
idenUfy a common denominator which could easily be transposed to the Community 
level, apart from the principle of mutual recognition..." However, with respect to the 
criteria for representativeness the Commission recognises the diversity in the specific 
terms of the requirements laid down, but concludes that nafional systems "make use 
(sometimes implicitly) of quandtative criteria of various types in about half of the 
Member States" and that "generally speaking, qualitafive criteria appear to be at least as 
important". The Communication also concludes that most Member States have at least 
one formal body for consultafion with the social partners at which most of the seats are 
occupied by the major national umbrella federations affiliated to UNICE and the ETUC, 
although in most cases a smaller number of seats are allocated to other organisations. 
Considering the results of the study the Commission drew two main messages which it 
set out in the Communication:'^ "(a) the diversity of practice in the different Member 
States is such that there is no single model which could be replicated at European level, 
and (b) the different Member States' systems having all taken so many years to grow and 
develop, it is difficult to see how a European system can be created by administrative 
decision in the short term". 
It is unclear what the above messages drawn from the research signify. Part (a) seems to 
suggest that the Commission was unable to base its criteria for the recognition of 
Communication, op cit, Annex 3, 3-4. 
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Communication, ibid, para 23. 
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European level social partners on any mutually agreed basis. However, it may equally 
mean that although no single model could be replicated, a number of common principles 
could be followed. Part (b) also causes some confusion since the following paragraph of 
the Communication does then go on to set out administrafive criteria by which a 
European system is created.'^ 
European Level Recognition for the Purposes of Formal Consultation 
The Communicafion states that, in order to take part in the SPA social dialogue, 
organisations should: 
1 "be cross-industry or relate to specific sectors or categories and be organised at 
European level" 
2 "consist of organisations which are themselves an integral and recognised part of 
Member State social partner structures and with the capacity to negotiate 
agreements, and which are representative of all Member States as far as possible" 
3 "have adequate structures to ensure their effective participation in the 
consultation process"^" 
A list of the organisations the Commission deems currently comply with these criteria are 
set out in Annex 2 of the Communication.^' 
These requirements contribute litde to the execution of the Commission's original 
objective to create a European level recognition process which involved an assessment 
of the representativeness of the European social partner organisations, suggesting that this 
notion was abandoned in light of the divergence in Member State systems brought to light 
by the Social Partners Study. Instead the procedure at European level remains parasitic 
on the wide ranging Member State requirements. The recognition test is, to a large 
'^  Communication, ibid, para 24. See Bercusson, European Lxibour Law, ibid, at 558. 
Communication, ibid, para 24. 
'^ For information the list is reproduced as Annex 6, below. 
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extent, directed towards the national member federations rather than the European level 
organisations themselves and is conducted according to the national law applicable to 
each of these member affiliations. This method follows Community practice with regard 
to the recognition of employees representatives as set out in the Directives on the 
Transfer of an Undertaking^^ and on Collective Redundancies,^ ^ which define workers 
representatives as those "provided for by the laws or practices of the Member States".^ '' 
In addition, by not encroaching on national systems of recognition, the European criteria 
may also be said to respect the principle of subsidiarity.^^ The application of national 
mechanisms tailored towards the specific needs of national recognition may not , 
however, sufficiently take into account the additional law-making function of the 
European level social dialogue. 
Despite this departure from its original objective, it remains unclear whether the results 
of the Social Partners Study have been completely abandoned as a basis for European 
level recognition. The criteria apply only "within the terms of Article 3 of the 
Agreement"^* and therefore to the formal consultation process only. As at national level, 
the Communication does not set out minimum requirements, compliance with which 
would render any number of organisations eligible for participation, but formally 
recognises a defined group of actors. However, unlike national practice, the 
Communication considers that "it is not necessary... to create some form of consultation 
body or umbrella haison committee"" for the purposes of formal consultation, although 
the Commission admits that this may need to be re-examined "in the light of experience 
as the process develops". Instead each organisation is invited to contribute its opinion 
on a individual basis, although the Commission has expressed a commitment to "promote 
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Directive 77/187/EEC, ibid, Art l(2)(c) and Directive 75/129/EEC, ibid. Art l(l)(b). 
See Art 3(b) E C and Chapter 8. 
Communication, op cit, para 24. 
Communication, ibid, para 27. 
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the development of new linking structures between all the social partners so as to help 
rationalise and improve the process."^* Even so, the absence of such a committee may 
not be conducive to compromise or mutual understanding between the two sides of 
industry. 
The criteria therefore set out no explicit minimum quantitative requirements for 
recognition, although some qualitative criteria are required. In particular, recognition 
demands organisation at European level. Aside from this, however, the other qualitative 
requirements are subject to major qualification, tend towards ambiguity and are expressed 
in wide language. 
The Communication states that the criteria apply only "as a matter of general principle".^' 
This may mean that the Commission is willing to recognise as social partners some 
organisations which are exceptions as they do not fulfil l the requirements. Alternatively 
it may equally mean that the criteria set out general requirements, although the 
Commission is to apply more specific ones. 
It is also unclear how the Commission proposes to assess whether national member 
organisations are "an integral... part of Member State social partner structures" or 
whether the European level organisations have "adequate structures" which can ensure 
their "effective participation" in the consultation process. In addition, it is unclear in 
what way the European organisations must be "representative of all Member States". 
Does this mean that they must contain national affiliations from each Member State or 
does it impose a more intrusive requirement that these national organisations must be 
"representative" of their Member State nationals? 
As to ambiguities, point 2, for example, states that organisations should "consist of 
organisations...". The meaning of "organisations" becomes unclear on examination of 
those recognised in practice in Annex 2. Although most are made up of national 
28 
Communication, ibid, para 26. 
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Communication, ibid, para 24. 
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federations of trade unions or employers' associations, there are some exceptions, such 
as the CEEP, which is instead made up of individual company members not organised 
at Member State level. In addition, the requirement that organisations must be 
"recognised"as "part of Member State social partner structures" needs clarification. The 
results of the Social Partners Study above show that different Member States employ 
differing procedures for recognition for the purposes of both collective bargaining and 
formal consultation. The limitation of the Commission criteria to Article 3 may suggest 
that the reference was intended to apply to recognition within national formal 
consultation structures. However, due to its internal organisation, the CEEP does not 
have member federations which participate in these structures. In addition Greece and 
Italy do not provide for formal consultation structures. Also ambiguous is the 
requirement that organisations must have "the capacity to negotiate agreements".^ " It is 
unclear whether this criterion is applicable to the national affiliations or to the European 
level organisations themselves. I f the former then, irrespective of whether the 
requirement that organisations must be "recognised" at national level only applies to 
formal consultation structures, this criterion also seems to necessitate recognition for 
collective bargaining. I f the latter, then the requirement seems to lack meaning. Any 
organisation at European level has the capacity to enter into an agreement due to their 
freedom to contract. However, many of the organisations recognised in Annex 2, 
including the 3 main organisations, the ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, lack any mandate to 
bargain on behalf of their member federations. The Commission has indicated that "only 
the organisations themselves are in a position to develop their own dialogue and 
negotiating structures"^' suggesting an unwillingness to require any form of mandate. 
This lack of precision in the language used allows for a great deal of discretion on the 
part of the Commission in its choice of organisations. It also calls into question how 
committed the Commission remain to the concept of representativeness as a requirement 
for recognition.^^ It is unclear how crucial the concept is in the Commission's assessment 
ECOSOC Opinion, op cit, point 2.1.12. 
'^ Communication, op cit, para 26. 
Bercusson, European Labour Law, op cit, at 560. 
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of whether organisations are "adequate structures to ensure their effective participation 
in the consultation process"." Although specifically referred to in point 2 of the criteria, 
the Communication only requires that European level organisations are "representative 
of all Member States'', not all workers and employers, and even then the notion is subject 
to the qualification "as far as possible". The accent on this principle in the Social 
Partners Study suggests that a much greater role for representativeness had originally 
been contemplated. 
European Level Recognition for the Purposes of Negotiation 
The above criteria apply "within the terms of Article 3 of the Agreement".^ '* No 
requirements are set out for recognition for the purposes of negotiation under Article 4. 
It seems therefore that the Commission may have intended that negotiations on the 
conclusion of European level agreements be determined by mutual recognition, in 
conformity with the predominant practice at national level as recognised by the Social 
Partners Study. In support of this conclusion the Communication states that, for the 
purposes of negotiation, "the social partners concerned will be those who agree to 
negotiate with each other".^ ^ The Social Partners Study also refers to the parties' 
"autonomous right of choosing the organisations with which they deem it appropriate to 
enter into contractual relations".^^ 
However, this division in personnel between the organisations consulted under Article 
3 and those able to negotiate under Article 4 ignores the structure of the social dialogue 
process set out in the SPA. Article 4(1) states that "should management and labour so 
desire, the dialogue between them at Community level may lead to contractual relations, 
including agreements". In Chapter 4 it was noted that agreements may be concluded as 
Communication, op cit, para 24. 
Communication, ibid, para 24. 
Communication, ibid, para 31. 
Social Partners Study, op cit, Annex 1,1. 
90 
a result of the initiative of the Commission through the consultation procedure in Article 
3, or as a result of the initiative of the social partners themselves. 
In the latter case of "own initiative" agreements there seems nothing within either the 
SPA or EC law to prevent any European level organisation exercising its freedom to 
conclude a contractual agreement with any other, irrespective of recognition under Annex 
2 of the Communication. In the former case, however, the negotiation procedure is 
initiated under Article 3(4) on the occasion of the second consultation procedure. The 
Communication states that "the social partners consulted by the Commission on the 
content of a proposal... may... inform the Commission of their wish to initiate the process 
provided for in Article 4"." This seems to presume that only those organisations 
consulted, ie those recognised under Annex 2, have the right to engage in negotiations. 
The Communication further states that "the question of whether an agreement between 
the social partners representing certain occupational categories or sectors constitutes a 
sufficient basis for the Commission to suspend its legislative action will have to be 
examined on a case-by-case basis with regard to the nature and scope of the proposal and 
the potential impact of any agreement between the social partners concerned on the issue 
which the proposals seek to address".^ ^ Where issues concern all Community employers 
and workers the Commission seems, as a rule, to require at least the agreement between 
the general cross-industry organisations, ETUC, UNICE and CEEP. 
Implementation of agreements may be "either in accordance with the procedures and 
practices specific to management and labour and the Member States or... by a Council 
decision on a proposal from the Commission".^' Where the social partners choose to 
implement an agreement by the first method, again, their freedom to contract at European 
level does not seem to prevent implementation within their own organisations of an 
agreement concluded between any trade union or employers association, whether or not 
recognised in Annex 2. However, with regard to implementation by Council decision the 
Communication, op cit, para 29. 
38 
Communication, ibid, para 30. 
Article 4(2). See Chapter 5. 
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Communication states that "the Commission will prepare proposals for decisions to the 
Council following consideration of the representative status of the contracting parties..." 
(etc).''° It is unclear whether this representativeness test may apply to all European 
organisations who conclude agreements, irrespective of the Annex 2 list. However, it is 
more likely that the Commission was referring to a restriction based on representativeness 
of agreements even between recognised Annex 2 organisations. In any case, it is unlikely 
that non-recognised parties to any agreement would pass this representativeness test 
should it also be applicable to them. 
Conclusion 
The Social Partners Study was concerned to a large extent with the development of a 
Community level concept of representativeness. However, in view of the conclusions to 
that study, which revealed the diversity of arrangements operating within the Member 
States, it seems that this exercise may have been abandoned. The Commission's criteria 
for recognition rest almost exclusively on national structures to determine 
representativeness. This choice of organisations will be assessed from the point of view 
of the "democratic" credentials of the social dialogue process in the following chapter. 
Communication, op cit, para 39. 
92 
Chapter 7 
T H E SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND DEMOCRACY 
Introduction 
It is widely perceived that the EU legislative process suffers from a "democratic deficit".' 
In particular critics have exemplified the inadequacy of the role of the European 
Parliament within European level decision-making.^ This problem was to some small 
extent addressed by the amendments made to the Treaty at Maastricht which provided for 
the "co-decision procedure".' However, it seems that in this case the hand which gives 
also takes away. The Maastricht Inter-governmental Conference also introduced the 
social dialogue procedure which operates to the almost complete exclusion of the 
Parliament with respect to social matters. 
The social dialogue procedure itself may be characterised as a "corporatist" arrangement, 
with the social partners as functional interest organisations operating within the realm of 
essentially public obligations.'' This chapter will assess this corporatist role against the 
background of the Community's desire to "further the democratic and efficient 
1 Neunreither, "The Democratic Deficit of the European Union: Towards Closer Cooperation 
Between the European Parliament and the National Parliaments", (1994) 29 Government and 
Opposition, 299-314; Neunreither, "The Syndrome of Democratic Deficit in the European 
Community", in Parry (ed). Politics in An Independent World, Elgar, 1994; Boyce, 'The 
Democratic Deficit of the European Community", (1993) 46 Parliamentary Affairs, 458-477; 
Tiilikainen, "The Problem of Democracy in the European Union" in Rosas and Antola (eds), A 
Citizens' Europe, Sage, 1995; Williams, "Sovereignty and Accountability in the European 
Community", (1990) 3 Political Quartedy, 299-317; Raworth, "A Timid Step Forwards: 
Maastricht and the Democratization of the European Community" (1994) 19 E L Rev, 17-33; Piris, 
"After Maastricht, Are the Community Institutions More Efficacious, More Democratic and More 
Transparent?", (1994) 19 E L Rev 449-487. 
See above note 1 and also Corbett, "Representing the People" in Duff, Pinder and Pryce, 
Maastricht and Beyond: Building the European Union, Routledge, 1994. 
Art 189c E C . 
Falkner, op cit; Lo Faro, op cit; Vobruba, "Social Policy on Tomorrow's Euro-Corporatist Stage" 
(1995) 5 JESP, 303-315 and Obradovic, "Accountability of Interest Groups in the Union 
Lawmaking Process", Paper presented to the W G Hart Legal Workshop, "Lawmaking in the 
European Union", 9-12 July 1996. 
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functioning"^ of the Community institutions in light of the democratic deficit. 
Corporatism 
There is no absolute consensus on the precise definition of the term "corporatism".^ As 
a political theory corporatism challenges the orthodox paradigm of pluralism, which can 
be characterised as an arrangement whereby a large number of groups representing 
different interests compete within the political market place for influence over 
government.' Corporatism recognises that a mutual dependance between organised 
functional interests and the public bureaucracy in the process of public decision-making 
is endemic to modem government.^ The concept examines the degree of interdependence 
and institutionalisation in the relationship between these private and public 
organisations.' Despite the lack of authoritative definition many commentators'" seem 
5 
10 
Treaty on European Union, Preamble. The Preamble also confirms the "attachment to the 
principles of liberty, democracy...", etc of the signatory parties. 
Williamson, Corporatism in Perspective, 1989, at 7; Cawson, Corporatism and Political Theory, 
Blackwell, 1986, at 22; Panitch "Recent Theorisations of Corporatism: Reflections on a Growth 
Industry", (1980) British Journal of Sociology, 159-187 and Birkinshaw, Harden and Lewis, 
Government by Moonlight, Hyman, 1990, 1, at 25. 
Schmitter defines pluralism as "a system of interest representation in which the constituent units 
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ordered and self-determined... categories which are not specifically licensed, recognized, 
subsidized, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the 
state and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective 
categories," in Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?", (1974) 36 Review of Politics, 85-
131, at 96, also published in Schmitter and Lehmbruch (eds), Trends Towards Corporatist 
Intermediation, London: Sage, 1979. See also Williamson, ibid, at 11 who characterizes 
pluralism as a "competitive market system of pressure group activity" while corporatism s seen 
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to have used as a reference point the work of Schmitter," who states that; 
"Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, 
non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated 
categories, recognised or licensed (if not created] by the State and granted a 
deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in 
exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and 
articulation of demands and supports". 
In its purist form, and as a concept in direct polarity with pluralism, several 
characteristics of a corporatist arrangement can be suggested. First, close, stable, 
regular'^ linkages must exist between the functional interest organisations and the state. 
Interest groups are attributed some form of public statusso that they may be seen as part 
of the "extended state".''' The role of the state as the arena in which corporatist practice 
takes place is fundamental. Collective bargaining between the competing interests of 
management and labour may not properly be described as "corporatist" unless there is a 
significant state presence.'^  Second, a limitation on competition between interest groups 
must be observable through the granting of recognition to some privileged groups, 
creating a degree of representational monopoly by excluding others.'^  Third, corporatism 
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must apply as a two-way exchange system.'^ The term "interest intermediation'^^ has 
been used to describe this relationship whereby, in return for privileged representational 
status, groups comply with certain government aims, creating for the state a "simplified 
external environment".'^ 
The above represents a view of corporatism as an ideal form. However, the concept can 
be applied along scale which sees corporatism and pluralism as the two diametrically 
opposed "end points on a continuum".^" Along this continuum arrangements can be seen 
as more or less corporatist. 
The Social Dialogue as a Corporatist Arrangement 
Pre-Maastricht the structure of interest representation within the Community could be 
described as "much more "pluralist" than corporatist",^' with large numbers of pressure 
groups involved in lobbying.^^ However, within the SPA the Community institutions 
delegate to the social partners a more formalised role in the creation of European public 
policy and law. This signals a move along the continuum away from pluralism and 
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towards the introduction of European level corporatism.^^ The two-stage consultation 
procedure, the potential to conclude collective agreements which later may be converted 
in Community law through the Council decision method, and the role of the social 
partners in the implementation of agreements and binding legislation deriving from the 
social dialogue constitute a usurpation of public law functions by private organisations. '^' 
The Community institutions, the "state" for these purposes, have delegated, in prescribed 
circumstances and with respect to pre-determined subject-matter,^^ the public function 
of law-making to the social partners, who consist of private organisations formed on the 
basis of functional representation.^ ^ The dialogue proceeds on the basis of a formalised. 
Treaty-based^^ and therefore stable structure as set out in the SPA and the Commission's 
Communication.^^ In addition the recognition of certain organisations for the purposes 
of the social dialogue creates a form of representative monopoly.^^ 
The symbiotic nature of intermediation is often exemplified through the self-regulatory 
actions of corporatist interest organisations. The exercise of control or discipline of 
private organisations over their membership through securing the public law task of 
implementation represents "corporatism with a vengeance".^ " Cawson holds that the 
existence of some form of self-regulation is a crucial to distinguish corporatism from 
mere consultation as a feature of pluralism.^' However, other commentators have 
observed that the regulatory function of the interest group in ensuring the compliance of 
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its members can be seen as signifying an advanced form of corporatism,^^ rather than 
being a definitional precept. 
To some extent the social dialogue envisages self-regulation through the voluntary 
"procedures and practices" method of implementation at European leveP^ and by 
allowing a Member State to entrust the implementation of Directives to the social 
partners at national level.However, it has already been observed-*^  that, at present, the 
ambiguous status of European collective agreements together with a lack of mandate, 
insufficient union coverage and the disparity of remedies for breach of agreements 
available across the Community make this method of implementation unattractive in 
contrast with the Council decision method. However, even where the Article 4 SPA 
negotiation procedure is not invoked the consultation process involves elements of 
corporatism due to the guaranteed attention received by the opinions of the social partners 
and the importance attached to them.^ ^ The procedural support of the SPA may 
eventually create the impetus for reform within the social partner organisations and 
increase support in terms of membership within the Member States. The potential future 
use of the alternative of the procedures and practices method may allow the social 
dialogue to continue along the continuum and develop into a more advanced corporatist 
arrangement.^' 
Corporatism And Democracy 
The social dialogue may be characterised as corporatist. This begs the question as to 
whether such a corporatist arrangement conforms with democratic principles. 
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What is Democracy? 
In literal terms democracy means rule by the demos, that is the people.^ ^ As a basis for 
the exercise of government in Western Europe it is uncontroversial. However, this wide 
concept can be interpreted in many different ways and the specific terms of its application 
are less easy to determine.^^ It is, however, possible to distinguish between direct and 
indirect democracies. Direct democracy can be characterised as popular self-government 
and is based on public participation.''" This type of self-governance is impractical 
considering the scale and complexity of modern political systems and has given way to 
indirect democracy, which is based on the nomination of representatives who govern on 
behalf of the people. Direct participation is limited to the act of voting at regular 
intervals."*' 
Since it is impractical for citizens to rule directly, representative democracy is based on 
the premise that elected polificians serve as the people's representatives by articulating 
and attempting to secure their interests within the process of political decision making.''^ 
Differences in opinion exist over fundamental questions such as who is to represent the 
public interest, how to define that interest, and how to make representatives accountable. 
Democracy and Corporatism 
Corporatism has been presented above as an arrangement in which the state extends 
privileged status to certain functional interest groups by the assignment to them of tasks 
of a public nature. As far as these functional interest groups are concerned their members 
enjoy a greater input into the decision-making process than through traditional territorial 
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methods of representation. This latter form of representation can be criticised because 
it attempts to homogenize the views of the citizenry. Since this is an impossible task 
elected territorial representatives in practice act in the name of the people, but substitute 
their own wills for those they represent.'*^ This problem may be less acute in the case of 
functional representation since it involves the representation of organised interests, where 
"the coincidence between the representative and the active and organised membership is 
very close".''^  However, even where functional representation is concerned the existence 
of representative, rather than direct, methods of participation mean that some degree of 
substitution is bound to exist."*^  
In contrast to pluralism, corporatism is based on the premise of according privileged 
status to a limited, specified inner circle of organisations. Corporatist organised interests 
are therefore able to exert greater influence over decision making since resources are not 
wasted on competition with other organisations'*^ and guaranteed importance is attached 
to their opinions. 
By definition, however, corporatism therefore excludes others and limits competition 
within the political marketplace.''^ The exclusive nature of corporatism has been 
criticised as threatening the democratic principle of equality since it creates a divide 
between "insiders" and "outsiders""** and denies access to influence over public policy to 
all "outsider", and therefore non-privileged, interests."' This includes not only non-
privileged interest groups, but also those whose interests are not organised, whether due 
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to lack of organisational or financial resources, 50 
Corporatism endows public status and authority to private interest organisations which 
exercise this public power within the private sphere and therefore outside the supervision 
of Parliament. Within the areas in which corporatist arrangements operate one can expect 
an attendant diminution of parliamentary and electoral politics based on territorial 
representation.^' Those falling outside privileged groups are therefore "doubly 
penalized": first by their exclusion from privilege and second by the devaluation of the 
influence of their elected representatives in Parliament." 
There is thus an opportunity for the excessive involvement of private interest groups'^  to 
the detriment of those who depend on their status as citizens for influence via 
parliamentary democratic procedures. This latter territorial representation is based on the 
aggregation of all interests within a particular constituency rather than on the functional 
interests of the few. The degree to which corporatism will in practice undermine 
democracy is therefore dependent upon the number and range of interests excluded. 
Democracy and the Social Dialogue 
It has already been noted in the previous chapter that, for the purposes of the social 
dialogue, the definition of "management and labour" includes only those organisations 
which fulf i l l the Commission's criteria^'' as set out in the Communication." Since this 
method of functional representation is based on organised interests it excludes those 
workers and employers who are not members of trade unions or employers associations. 
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The graph set out in Annex 5 below shows that organised workers can be said to make 
up a majority of the workforce in only 6 Member States: Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Sweden and Finland. Membership is particularly low in France and Spain 
where trade unions represent approximately 10% of workers and is in decline both 
throughout Europe and Worldwide.^^ 
The organisations recognised by no means constitute all organised workers and 
employers groups within the Community. The CESI," for example, a confederation of 
independent trade unions who represent between 5 and 7 million members,^ * has not been 
recognised by the Commission. The European Parliament has commented that the 
Commission's list is "unbalanced" and has called for better representation of all 
employers' and workers' organisations.^' 
The social partners only represent the views of those people currently in employment. 
There may be a posidve case for the inclusion of the views and interests of other 
interested parties, inter alia, the unemployed,*' as members of society wishing to join the 
workforce, the retired, as those with a long experience within employment, and 
consumers, as the purchasers of goods and services resulting out of the employment 
relationship.*' Although the remit of the social dialogue is largely confined to issues 
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concerning the employment relationship and working conditions'^ and the involvement 
of workers and employers groups may lead to primary attention being focussed on these 
issues to the detriment of wider "citizen topics",'^ some of the issues already proposed 
under the social dialogue concern moral issues, which perhaps call for the input of the 
whole of European society. The proposals on part-time and temporary workers and 
parental leave, for example, concern the issue of the role of women at work and within 
the family.^ 
The Commission's list of recognised social partner organisations does, however, only 
apply "within the terms of Article 3 of the Agreement".'^ No requirements are set out for 
recognition for the purposes of negotiating an agreement under Article 4. The 
Communication notes that, for these purposes, "the social partners will be those who 
agree to negotiate with each other".'' The Social Partners Stud^ also refers to the 
parties' "autonomous right of choosing the organisations with which they deem it 
appropriate to enter into contractual relations".'^ In practice the individual social partner 
organisations have imposed their own restrictions on recognition with only the ETUC, 
UNICE and the CEEP being involved in negotiations, which further decreases the 
number of workers represented within the social dialogue.'' The graph in Annex 8 below 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
Article 2 SPA. 
Vobruba, op cit, at 312 and Obradovic, op cit, at 9. Both note that the Commission has 
recognized the problem that the Community has a tendency to reduce citizens to employees. See 
also Commission's Green Paper, European Social Policy: Options For the Union, COM (93) 551 
final, 17 November 1993, which asks "How can we stimulate a kind of consolidated statement of 
citizens' rights within the Union, which would make more explicit existing rights and seek to shift 
the existing "labour market orientation" to a more general people-oriented approach on the basis 
of values common to Member States?" 
Consultation in these cases should perhaps have involved womens groups and the Equal 
Opportunities Comjnission to a greater extent. 
Communication, op cit, para 24. 
Communication, ibid, para 31. 
Op cit. 
Social Partners Study, op cit. Annex 1, at 1. 
Council Resolution on Certain Aspects for a European Union Social Policy: A Contribution to 
Economic and Social Convergence in the Union, op cit, para 21. 
103 
illustrates the proportion of members of the ETUC in comparison with all workers in 
each of the Member States. Only in Belgium, Denmark and Ireland do members of the 
ETUC make up a majority. 
At present and agreement has been concluded in only one case,™ on the subject of 
parental leave. Consultations were brought to a halt by 3 of the 28 recognised social 
partner organisations, the general cross-industry organisations who originally took part 
in the Val Duchesse social dialogue, the ETUC, CEEP and UNICE. The social partners 
have recently agreed to begin negotiations on atypical workers in September 1996,^ ' again 
involving only these organisations. The "substantial body of experience behind the social 
dialogue" established between these 3 organisations was expressly recognised in the 
Communication.'^ However, even before negotiations on parental leave had begun this 
exclusivity was criticised by other organisations, including UEAPME, CEC'^ and CESI, 
who had expressed a willingness to participate in the talks.''' The Secretary General of 
UEAPME told the press that "the validity of Maastricht social dialogue is being called 
into question i f it is limited to the present parties".'^ 
The main objection to the monopoly created by UNICE, ETUC and CEEP was set out in 
a letter to the President of the Commission, lacques Santer, in which the President of the 
CEC stated that the negotiations excluded "interprofessional organisations representing 
certain categories of workers... who are, however, recognised as a category of specific 
importance in the social dialogue"'* as a necessary result of their inclusion as recognised 
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social partners in Annex 2 of the Communication. The Secretary General of UEAPME 
has also pointed out that the Commission has set itself up as Secretariat for Val-
Duchesse-type social dialogue and it consequently "contributes considerable financial 
support to this exclusivity"." In particular, the claims to participation of UEAPME, 
which represents craft, small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), are strong since both 
the SPA^^  and the Communicatioil' explicitly refer to the protection that should be 
accorded to small and medium-sized undertakings in any agreements or legislation based 
on the social dialogue.^" The President of the French Republic, Jacques Chirac expressed 
surprise at UEAPME's situation at a press conference after the Cannes Summit and has 
now lent his support to their full participadon.^' 
The monopoly created by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP threatens not only to cast doubts 
over the legitimacy of the social dialogue, but has also provoked the "outsider" 
organisations to threaten non-recognition and non-compliance with any agreements 
reached. The Secretary General of UEAPME has issued the statement that "the craft 
enterprises and SMEs represented by UEAPME will reject such agreements i f they are 
not involved in the negotiations."^^ Similarly EUROCOMMERCE has urged the Council 
of Ministers not to apply the accord to commerce employers unless EUROCOMMERCE 
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agrees.*^ In addition, the conclusions of the EMC General Assembly in Luxembourg 
revealed that its member organisations do not consider themselves bound by the results 
of negotiations in the context of the social dialogue in which they have not taken part. 
As a result the EMC has indicated that its "national organisations will conduct action to 
refuse the results of negotiations in which they did not participate, insisting on the fact 
that the existence of problems specific to management is eclipsed".^ Most significantly, 
in a letter to the Jacques Santer and Padraig Flynn, UEAPME has indicated that in the 
absence of a solution "a legal conflict between the European Commission and UEAPME 
seems inevitable".^^ 
The European Parliament has added its voice to the criticism of this arrangement. It 
states that the Commission should "give a hearing to all social partners" and promote 
dialogue between all the organisations meeting the criteria and has specifically referred 
to the case of organisations representing SMEs.** In addition it has called for the 
Commission to set up an information desk for non-representative European 
organisations.*' 
The Role of the European Parhament within the Social Dialogue 
Within the Community the territorial interests of citizens are represented by the members 
of the European Parliament. Direct elections have taken place since 1979.** All nationals 
of Member States have the right to vote as well as citizens of the Union residing in 
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Member States of which they are not nationals.^' 
The role of the Parliament within the European legislative process is notoriously weak.'" 
It is rather the Council of Ministers which has the ultimate power of decision-making. 
The Council is an unelected" body consisting of national government representatives. 
Widespread criticism of the insufficient role of the Parliament has led to the introduction 
of the co-operation'^ and co-decision'^ procedures as introduced by the Single European 
Act and the Maastricht Treaty, respectively. 
Within the areas of social policy addressed by the SPA the Parliament is now largely 
redundant'" with consultation between the social partners as functional interest 
organisations occurring in place of consultation with the territorial representatives. 
However, the Commission has indicated in its Communication that it intends to make 
sure that the Parliament is "fully informed at all stages of any consultation or negotiation 
procedure involving the social partners".'^ The Parliament will not be required or even 
approached to give an opinion and although it may do so of its own initiative there is no 
duty on the social partners to take this opinion into consideration. 
Where an agreement is reached as part of the Article 4 negotiation process the 
Commission is not legally required to consult the Parliament on requests made to it by 
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the social partners concerning the implementation of an agreement by the Council 
decision method.'* However the Commission intends to "inform Parliament and to send 
it the text of the agreement, together with its proposal for a decision and the explanatory 
memorandum, so that Parliament may, should it consider it advisable, deliver its opinion 
to the Commission and to the Council"." Should the Parhament decide to issue such an 
opinion it would do so at the end of the legislative process. Since the Commission has 
stated that it will propose to the Council the adoption of a decision on the "agreement as 
concluded"'* there seems littie room for discussion on the content of the proposed 
measure. The opinion could influence the adoption of the proposal only in its assessment 
of the legality of the agreement." 
Where no agreement is reached the Commission may consider the possibility of 
proposing legislation."'" Before the adoption of directives under the SPA the Council 
must consult the Parliament concerning matters based on Article 2(3) and do so in 
accordance with the co-operation procedure'"' for matters faUing under Article 2(1).'"^ 
Such consultation is likely, however, to be overshadowed to a large extent by the views 
of the social partners which may be taken into account by the Commission in drafting any 
subsequent proposals even in the event that no agreement is reached.'"' 
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The Parliament has indicated its dissatisfaction with this role of "onlooker".'** In 
response it has urged the Commission and the Council to enter into a serious dialogue 
with it and to consider the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement with a view to 
giving it "an active role in the adoption of the decision implementing such 
agreements".'"^ In particular, Parliament has requested a right of initiative so that it may 
request the Commission to initiate the legislative procedure where an agreement by 
management and labour is rejected.'"' However, the Parliament seems to have mixed 
feelings about the social dialogue.'"^ Its requests for involvement do not challenge the 
right of the social partners to determine the content of agreements. Moreover, it has 
stated that the social dialogue constitutes "an essential condition for the achievement of 
the social dimension"'"^ and that their extensive consultation rights provide the 
Community with "an opportunity to shape the European welfare scene in a way which 
is close to current practice and the citizen".'"' Despite the fact that the role given to the 
social partners under this process is far greater than that accorded to the Parliament under 
the EC Treaty and that it reduces the Parliament's own powers within the field of social 
policy, the Parliament do not seem to go so far as to claim that the social dialogue 
increases the Community's democratic deficit. no 
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European Parliament, Resolution on the Application of the Agreement on Social Policy, op cit, 
at para A. 
European Parliament, Resolution on the Social Policy Agreement, op cit, at para H. 
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Conclusion 
The social dialogue is a corporatist arrangement whereby interest groups, in this case the 
social partners, carry out public law tasks through their role of creating and implementing 
European level legislation. Corporatist theory indicates that such arrangements may not 
be consistent with democracy. Within the social dialogue procedure the Commission has 
recognised 28 organisations representing a host of interests, both sectoral and cross-
industry. However, in practice the negotiation of agreements is the concern of only the 
3 main general cross-industry organisations, UNICE, the CEEP and the ETUC. As a 
result the social dialogue process can be seen as essentially undemocratic. 
However, corporatism may be seen as a threat to democracy only where it undermines 
a pre-existing efficient form of popular representation.'" Its critics have based their 
objections on a comparison with national parliamentary legislation. The Community 
suffers from an acute democratic deficit, in particular with few powers being given to the 
territorial representatives of the European citizenry within the European Parliament. 
Comparatively, therefore the social dialogue seems like a step forward in the recognition 
of interests and the participation of citizens within the legislative process."^ 
"' Hirst, op cit, at 7. 
' '^  Vobruba, op cit, at note 11. 
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Chapter 8 
S U B S I D I A R I T Y AND T H E S O C I A L D I A L O G U E 
Introduction 
The principle of subsidiarity and the new social dialogue competences of the European 
level social partners were simultaneously formally introduced into the Community legal 
order by the Treaty on European Union. Subsidiarity can be defined as a mechanism 
which seeks to provide guidance concerning the functional allocation of legislative and 
administrative competences between different levels of organisation. The origins of the 
principle lie in Roman Catholic social philosophy and it is generally traced to the 1931 
Papal Encyclical of Pope Pius X I , Quadregisimo Anno, which states that "it is an 
injustice , a grave evil and a disturbance of the right order, for a larger and higher 
association to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller 
and lower societies". 
Within the Community the concept of subsidiarity is not new. It has been debated since 
the early 1970s' and has since arguably implicitiy influenced Community policy-making. 
Its central importance is now confirmed as a guiding principle for the achievement of the 
objectives of the Union by Article B TEU. The application of the principle within the 
Community is set out in Article A TEU which encourages decision-making "as closely 
as possible to the citizen" and Article 3b EC^ which states that: 
"The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by 
this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. 
1 Cass, "The Word That Saves Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Division of 
Powers Within the European Community", (1992) 29 CML Rev, 1107-1136. 
Introduced by the TEU. 
I l l 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall 
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far 
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or ejfects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. 
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve 
the objectives of this Treaty". 
The Commission's Communication on the application of the SPA' states that the role of 
the social partners within the social dialogue process recognises "a dual form of 
subsidiarity within the social field: on the one hand, subsidiarity regarding regulation at 
national and Community level; on the other, subsidiarity as regards the choice, at 
Community level, between the legislative approach and the agreement-based approach". 
This chapter will consider the impact of the application of subsidiarity on the social 
dialogue and the extent to which the role of the social partners recognises the principle. 
However, before such an assessment can be made it is necessary to provide an 
explanation as to the meaning of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity has been defined in numerous 
ways and its varying implications for the Community detailed by a multitude of 
commentators.'* The intention of the following section is not to provide a conclusive 
interpretation, since this is a matter for the Court of Justice, but to provide some general 
conclusions as to the consequences of the application of subsidiarity. 
Op cit, para 6c. 
Eg Toth "A Legal Analysis of Subsidiarity", Steiner "Subsidiarity Under the Maastricht Treaty" 
and Emiliou "Subsidiarity: Panacea or Fig Leaf?", all in O'Keeffe and Twomey, Legal Issues of 
the Maastricht Treaty, Wiley, 1995; Duff, 'Towards a Definition of Subsidiarity", in Duff (ed), 
Subsidiarity Within the European Community, Federal Trust, 1993; Peterson, "Subsidiarity: A 
Definition to Suit Any Vision?", (1994) 147 Parliamentary Affairs Journal, 116-132; 
Constantinesco, "Who's Afraid of Subsidiarity?", (1991) 11 Yearbook of European Law, 33-55; 
Editorial, "The Subsidiarity Principle", (1990) 27 CML Rev, 181-184; Toth, "The Principle of 
Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty", (1992) 29 CML Rev, 1079-1105; Emiliou, "Subsidiarity: 
An Effective Barrier Against 'the Enterprises of Ambition'?", (1992) 17 E L Rev, 383-407 and 
Cass, op cit. 
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Subsidiarity within the European Union 
While Community objectives and areas for potential action are laid down in general terms 
within the Treaty, subsidiarity, as defined by Article 3b offers day to day guidance on the 
appropriate level for the exercise of action in the individual case.^  Although often linked 
to federalism,^ subsidiarity does not call for a consititution dictating a static entrenchment 
of reponsibilities.^ The principle is a dynamic one, which allows Community action to 
be expanded or restricted according to the requirements of the particular circumstances 
of the case. 
Article 3b provides a procedure for answering two questions: (1) should the Community 
act, and (2) what should be the intensity or nature of the Community's action?^ 
1 Should The Community Act? 
The first paragraph of Article 3b restates the principle of conferred powers, that in order 
to achieve its objectives, the Community may only act within the powers conferred upon 
it by the Treaty. The second paragraph goes on to exclude the application of subsidiarity 
from areas of concurrent competence. 
Article 3b continues that "the Community shall take action... only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States and 
can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved 
by the Community". The test is essentially one of comparative allocative efficiency and 
Steiner, ibid, at 59. 
Eg Bermann, "Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the 
United States", (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review, 331- 455. 
Van Kersbergen and Verbeek, "The Politics of Subsidiarity in the European Union", (1994) 32 
JCMLS, 215-236, at 225. 
Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council in Edinburgh, 12 December 1992, Annex 1, 13 
and Commission Communication to the Council and Parliament outlining its proposals for the 
application of the Subsidiarity principle. Bull of the E C 10-92, point 2.2.1. 
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comprises two parts. First, the objecfives of the proposed action must be unable to be 
"sufficiently achieved" at Member State level. Second, they must therefore be able to be 
"better achieved" by Community action. Proof of both these parts must be substantiated 
by qualitative or, wherever possible, quantitative criteria.' In order to fulf i l l the "better 
achievement" test the "scale or effects" of the problem must justify Community level 
action. The Conclusions of the European Council in Edinburgh have confirmed that 
Community action must produce "clear benefits"'° by reason of the scale or effects of the 
problem as compared with Member State action. The reference to "scale" indicates that 
the problem must involve a cross-boundary dimension, although "effects" is a much more 
elusive term, with a potentially wide ambit." The Commission's Communication on the 
principle of Subsidiarity'^ states that the test includes asking what Community action 
adds to Member State acUon, which is the most efficient and cost efficient and what 
would be the cost of non-action. At the end of the day, however, "better" is a subjective 
comparator which reduces the test of subsidiarity to a large extent to one of political 
choice'^ rather than of objective social, economic, technical or legal proof.''' 
The outcome of the test clearly depends upon the goals the Community sets for itself.'^ 
The above two criteria are not difficult to fulfil l where Community action seeks to create 
a level playing field in order to correct distortions within the internal market.'^  Social and 
employment law is less directly a cross-boundary issue, but action may be justified in 
10 
12 
13 
14 
16 
Conclusions of the Edinburgh Council, ibid, at 19. 
Conclusions of the Edinburgh Council, ibid, at 19. 
Neuwahl, "A Europe Close to the Citizen? The 'Trinity Concepts' of Subsidiarity, Transparency 
and Democracy", in Rosas and Antola (eds), A Citizens Europe, Sage, 1995, at 55. 
Commission Communication on the Principle of Subsidiarity, op cit. 
Berman, op cit, at 335. 
Scott, Peterson and Millar, "Subsidiarity: A Europe of the Regions v The British Constitution?", 
(1994) 32 JCMS, 47-67, at 57. 
Hartley, "Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht Agreement", (1992) 42ICLQ, 
213-237, at 217. 
Steiner, op cit, 61 and Van Kersbergen, op cit, at 228. 
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many cases on the basis of the problems associated with social dumping.'^ 
The burden of proof lies in all cases with the Community. It is presumed that action at 
the level of the Member State is "better" unless and until the Commission proposes 
action at Community level. Despite subsidiarity's dynamic quality, this presumption may 
allow the principle to develop into a weapon that Member States can use in order to 
protect their own national interests.'* Subsidiarity has, for example, been dubbed by the 
British as the principle of minimum interference'' and championed by John Major as an 
indicator of less future Community interference. 
2 The Intensity or Nature of the Community's Action? 
The third paragraph of Article 3b states that "any action by the Community shall not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty" and is a restatement 
of the principle of proportionality as determined by the case law of the Court of Justice.^ " 
The case of Denkavi^^ defined the principle in similar terms: "By virtue of the principle 
of proportionality... measures adopted by Community institutions must not exceed what 
is appropriate and necessary to attain the objective pursued". The Court has developed 
the principle to mean that Community measures must reasonably reflect the objective to 
be achieved, that the costs of adopting the measure do not outweigh its benefits and that 
the measure chosen must represent the least burdensome choice of the variety of options 
17 
19 
20 
21 
Spicker, "The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Social Policy of the European Community", 
(1991) 1 JESP, 3-14, at 8, Van Kersbergen, op cit, at 231. 
Van Kersbergen, op cit, at 227; Coppel, "Edinburgh Subsidiarity", (1993) 44 NILQ, 179-187, at 
180. In Delors, 'The Principle of Subsidiarity: Contribution to the Debate", in Subsidiarity: The 
Challenge of Change, Proceedings of the Colloquium organised by the European Institute of 
Public Administration, March 21-22 1991, 13 Delors states that subsidiarity is sometimes used 
as an "alibi" and as " a fig leaf., to conceal an unwillingness to honour the conunitments which 
have already been endorsed" within the E C Treaty. 
Toth, "The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty", op cit, at 1105. 
Commission Communication on the Principle of Subsidiarity, op cit. 
Case 15/83, [1984] ECR 2171, at 2175. See also Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschafi, 
[1970] E C R 1125. 
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available.^^ 
The proportionality test seeks to restrict the scope and method of regulation once the 
question of whether the Community should act has been determined. Community 
measures should therefore aim towards being framework in nature, outlining minimum 
standards and leaving as much scope as possible for national decision-making. Directives 
are therefore to be preferred to regulations or decisions, and where appropriate non-
binding measures such as recommendafions should be used.^ ^ 
Subsidiarity and the Social Dialogue 
The obligations outlined in Article 3b apply with reference to "Community action". The 
question of compliance with subsidiarity must form part of the initial consultations on an 
initiative.^'' The Commission must take the principle into account when drawing up a 
proposal and justify the relevance of the initiative with regard to subsidiarity in an 
explanatory memorandum.^ ^ The Council's negotiations on the substance of a proposal 
must also include an examination of the issue.^ ^ 
Curiously, considering the primacy of the principle within the Community legal order, 
the Commission's Communication on the SPA does not expressly oblige the social 
partners to take subsidiarity into account during the social dialogue procedure. The 
documents beginning the first consultation stage under Article 3(2) SPA have, however, 
in practice required the social partners to consider the questions of the necessity of 
22 
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24 
25 
26 
Bermann, op cit, at 389. 
Conclusions of the Edinburgh Council, op cit, at 20, Commission Communication on Subsidiarity, 
op cit. 
Conclusions of the Edinburgh Council, ibid, at 22. 
European Parliament, Interinstitutional agreement on procedures for implementing the principle 
of subsidiarity. Doc PE 176.643, 17 November 1993 and Conclusions of the Edinburgh Council, 
ibid, at 22. 
Conclusions of the Edinburgh Council, ibid, at 23 and Commission Communication on 
Subsidiarity, op cit. 
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Community action and whether action should take the form of legislation, 
recommendations, collective agreements or anything else," although again without 
express reference to subsidiarity. With regard to agreements which are later implemented 
by Council decision and which therefore become part of Community law there is no 
doubt that their form and content must comply with subsidiarity. The same may not be 
true of agreements which are implemented by the "procedures and practices" method. 
I f an agreement merely retains the status of a private contract^ * between the social 
partners, the Article 3b obligation may not apply since the contract may not fall into the 
category of "'Community action". However, the problems associated with enforcement 
of agreements implemented by this latter method and the negative attitude of UNICE 
towards "own inifiafive" agreements means that it is likely for the present that all 
agreements will be converted into a Council decision. 
The operation of the social dialogue and the potential for the conclusion of Community 
level agreements is therefore dependent on the proposal of legislation by the 
Commission. The presumption in favour of the Member State as the "better" level 
inherent in Arficle 3b militates against centralised Community action. Despite the 
malleable quality of the "better achievement" test the Community institutions will be 
forced to consider the principle of subsidiarity carefully since review of compliance is 
subject to control by the Court of Justice.^' In addition, politically the application of the 
principle may cause the Commission to exercise some degree of caution in the proposal 
of a large quantity of measures.'" Although not specifically referring to subsidiarity, the 
Commission's Social Action Programme for 1995-97" includes few new legislative 
proposals and therefore few opportunities for the social dialogue. 
27 
28 
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30 
31 
See for example EIRR 262, Nov ember 1995, 3 regarding the first consultation document on 
Atypical Work and Agence Europe 516, 6 July 95, 15 regarding the Burden of Proof in Cases of 
Sex Discrimination. 
See Chapter 5. 
Conclusions of the Edinburgh Council, op cit, at 16. 
Emiliou, "Subsidiarity; Panacea or Fig Leaf?", op cit, at 77. 
COM (95) 134, 12 April 1995. 
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Where subsidiarity does allow for regulation at Community level the proportionality 
principle of Article 3b favours flexible, non-binding, framework action. The 
Commission's Communication on subsidiarity specifically encourages agreements by the 
social partners as an alternative to legislation. The presumption of Article 4(2) SPA that 
the agreement will stand alone, unless implementation by Council decision is requested 
by the social partners further illustrates the importance attached to non-binding action. 
The Commission's Communication on the SPA points to the choice between the 
legislative approach and the agreement-based approach^^ as recognition of subsidiarity. 
In practice where an agreement is concluded it is likely to form the basis of a Directive 
through implementadon by Council decision rather than to stand alone. The uncertain 
legal status of agreements at Community level, the variety in status of agreements at 
national level and the differences in membership of trade unions across the Union make 
this option untenable as far as the enforcement of rights deriving from the agreements are 
concerned. The lack of real choice between the two approach favours the creation of 
legislation and pays a superficial respect to the proportionality principle of Article 3b. 
A Wider Definition of Subsidiarity 
Article 3b provides a mechanism to determine the exercise of power along a vertical 
scale, aiming at decisions being taken "as closely as possible to the citizen"" by 
restricting Community level action with the burden of justification. However, this 
formulation of subsidiarity operates only as between action at Community level and 
Member State level and offers no guidance as to how to determine power sharing along 
a horizontal axis. 
•'^  Communication, op cit, para 6c. 
" Art A TEU. 
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The European Parliament has distinguished between vertical and horizontal 
subsidiarity,''' the vertical concept referring to the allocation of competences between 
different levels of authority (eg European or national level) and the horizontal to 
allocation at the same level.'' In the context of the social dialogue a horizontal 
application of subsidiarity could provide guidance as to the choice between action by the 
Community institutions and the European level social partners at Community level and 
between the national public authorities and the national social partners at Member State 
level. 
While recognising that Article 3b refers only to vertical subsidiarity the Opinion of 
ECOSOC on the Commission's Communication'* suggests that the SPA may reveal 
possible indications of the application of horizontal subsidiarity and several examples are 
cited.'^ First, within the Declaration on Article 4(2) SPA the Member States expressly 
delegate to collective bargaining the development of the content of EC level agreements 
and acknowledge no obligadon to undertake legislation. Second, Article 2(4) SPA allows 
the implementation of Directives at Member State level to be entrusted to management 
and labour, subject to a guarantee by the Member State of the results imposed. Third, 
Article 2(6) excludes the areas of "pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the 
right to impose lock-outs" from the legislative remit of the Council. Instead the social 
partners are to exercise competence on these issues, since their capacity to conclude 
agreements under Article 4 SPA is not so restricted. Last, the principle of autonomy of 
the social partners may influence the division of responsibilities between the social 
partners and the authorities. ECOSOC suggests that this recognition of horizontal 
subsidiarity at European level follows its increased recognition at Member State level,'* 
notably through the case law of the Court of Justice which has determined that directives 
34 
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36 
37 
38 
European Parliament, Giscard d'Estaing (Rapporteur), Interim Report Drawn up on Behalf of the 
Committee on Institutional Affairs on the Principle of Subsidiarity, Doc A3-163/90. 
See Bercusson, European Labour Law, op cit, at 56. 
ECOSOC Opinion, op cit. 
ECOSOC Opinion, ibid, at point 1.3.6. 
ECOSOC Opinion, ibid, at point 1.3.7. 
119 
may be implemented by national collective agreements in the first instance, although the 
Member State must guarantee the results imposed.^' 
If the examples cited above are indeed cases of horizontal subsidiarity, it seems that the 
concept favours devolving responsibility to the social partners rather than action by the 
governmental institutions of the Community or the Member State. In this respect one 
could add that a Council decision implementing a Community level agreement is limited 
to making binding the provisions of the agreement as concluded, with no scope for 
amendments''^  and that implementation by this method may not occur except at the joint 
request of the signatory parfies."' 
If one assumes therefore that horizontal subsidiarity is functioning at Community level"*^  
and that the autonomy given to the social partners is its end product, the question then 
arises as to the criteria for application of the principle.'*^ The criteria set out in Article 3b 
refer only to vertical subsidiarity and are incapable of informing a horizontal allocation 
of competences. It is submitted that some light can be shed on this question by 
examining the values that underpin the concept of subsidiarity. 
The strictly legal formulation of Article 3b ignores the socio-political and moral values 
which form the essence of the origins of subsidiarity in the Catholic social doctrine 
referred to in the introduction to this chapter. This doctrine defines subsidiarity not only 
by reference to efficiency, but also recognises that the concept has a moral aspect which 
encourages the autonomy of social organisations within a plural society.'''' State 
intervention is only justified when it is necessitated by the failure of these organisations. 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Case 143/83, Commission v Kingdom of Denmark, [1985] ECR 427. See also Chapter 5. 
Communication, op cit at para 41. 
Art 4(2) SPA. 
As Bercusson does in European Labour Law, op cit, at 558. 
Bercusson, European Labour Law, ibid, at 533 and 558. 
Cass, op cit, at 1111; Van Kersbergen, op cit, at 222 and Emiliou, "Subsidiarity: An Effective 
Barrier Against "the Enterprises of Ambition"?", op cit, at 387. 
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The State has an obligation to intervene by taking appropriate measures to increase the 
capacity of such organisations to act autonomously.''^ Bermanif* has identified the 
virtues of this autonomous local governance in the following ways. Recognition of the 
autonomy of social organisations allows for the increased participafion of individuals in 
rule-making. Subsidiarity also promotes political liberty by encouraging the diffusion of 
authority between different levels of governance and flexibility by enabling the law to be 
more responsive to the community it serves. In addition the principle also respects the 
internal divisions of the state and allows them to preserve their own diverse social and 
cultural identities. Essentially the merits of subsidiarity lie in the fact that it advances a 
participatory democracy by devolving power from the state.''^  
This wider definition of subsidiarity may be implicit in the Arficle A TEU notion that 
decision-making should occur "as closely as possible to the cifizen".''* The social 
dialogue procedure complies to a large extent with this concepfion by devolving 
responsibility from the Commission to non-State social partner organisafions who 
represent the workers and employers for whom they regulate."' The Commission's 
Communication on Subsidiarity favours agreements in this respect since they "are 
based... on a partnership with bodies which are closer to the individual than the 
Community institutions". Furthermore the Commission has justified the need for action 
on parental leave on the basis that "the social partners... have agreed that it is necessary"'" 
rather than on any criteria of efficiency or scale and effects and the type of action, a 
Council direcfive, on the basis that the social dialogue allowed the "social partners and 
not the Community to fix its content"." 
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Delors, "The Principle of Subsidiarity: Contribution to the Debate", op cit at 7-8 and 16-18. 
Neuwahl, op cit, at 41. 
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Conclusion 
The social dialogue recognises the Commission's concept of dual subsidiarity in practice 
only to the extent that one is prepared to accept a wider definifion of subsidiarity to 
encompass a horizontal dimension. As regards subsidiarity between regulation at 
national and Community level the Article 3b comparative allocative efficiency test 
expresses a preference for decision making at the level of the Member State, implying a 
marginal role for Community social dialogue which is to a large degree dependent on the 
Commission's legislative initiatives. Subsidiarity as regards the choice at Community 
level between the legislative and the agreement based approach sits uneasily in practice 
within the proportionality requirements of Article 3b. 
However, there are increasing indications that the Community has been influenced by a 
horizontal application of subsidiarity. This approach seems to favour input by the social 
partners into the Community legislative process, irrespective of the eventual form that 
regulation takes, to the extent that the dialogue advances a participatory democracy. In 
the light of the conclusions established in Chapter 7 regarding the corporatist nature of 
the social dialogue, however, it may be eirgued that in practice this dialogue cannot be 
said to be democratic and therefore can neither be said to comply with this wider 
horizontal definition of subsidiarity. 
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Chapter 9 
CONCLUSION 
The Current Role of the Social Dialogue 
Since ratification of the Maastricht Treaty the social dialogue procedure of the SPA has 
been initiated on several occasions. The social partners have been requested to consider 
the possible direction and the content of Community action on the subjects of European 
Works Councils, parental leave, the burden of proof in the case of sex discrimination, 
part-time and temporary workers, national level information and consultation and most 
recently sexual harassment and the flexibility of working time and safety. So far the 
procedure has been completed on only two occasions. The first led to the creation of the 
Directive on European Works Councils and the second to the conclusion of an agreement 
between the social partners on parental leave and leave for family reasons which has 
subsequently been converted into a directive. The adoption of European level regulation 
in these areas is a significant step forward for European social policy since successive 
proposals on both of these issues have previously failed to be adopted due to the 
requirement of unanimity under EC Treaty legal bases. In addition it seems likely that 
some form of regulation will be adopted in the near future concerning many of the other 
areas thus far referred to the social partners. 
Despite these results the social dialogue can by no means be said to have been a complete 
success. The problems besetting the development of the social dialogue outiined in 
Chapter 2 still dominate the new SPA procedure. In particular, both social partners have 
not yet fully recognised their common responsibility in the building of a European social 
area.' The presence of the employers association, UNICE, within the social dialogue may 
be more strategic than positive. In addition neither party to the dialogue has indicated a 
willingness to engage in negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement of their own 
' Teague, "Between Convergence and Divergence: Possibilities for a European Community System 
of Labour Market Integration", (1993) 132 International Labour Review, 391-406, at 397. 
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initiative. 
Although it is the social partners who are best placed to gauge the needs of industry, the 
social dialogue therefore remains responsive to Commission proposals, ie the social 
dialogue can be said to be reactive rather than proactive. The impact of the application 
of vertical subsidiarity as set out in the first part of Article 3b EC militates against large-
scale action in the social field at European level, with a presumption in favour of national 
competence, therefore potentially offering a diminishing number of legislative proposals 
and therefore opportunities for utilising the social dialogue. 
Despite the continuing resistance of the UK Conservative govemment to the adoption of 
binding social regulation at European level, the Commission has, nevertheless, proved 
that it will make use of the altemative mechanism of the SPA when necessary. However, 
the SPA has been used as a measure of "last resort" with measures first being proposed 
under the EC Treaty in spite of the UK's previous rejection of proposals for European 
level social regulation as a matter of principle, rather than on the basis of substantive 
content or wording. Such is the desire to include all 15 Member States in any measure 
adopted that the Commission has been prepared to dilute proposals in order to attract the 
UK's vote. 
With a detailed proposal already in existence, effective consultation and bargaining 
between the social partners has been hindered. "Bargaining in the shadow of the law" has 
ensured that negotiations have taken the form of strategic trade offs based on the wording 
of previous proposals. The agreement on parental leave represents the end product of 
these trade offs rather than any true consensus between the social partners as to how the 
issue of the reconciliation of work and family life should be dealt with at European level. 
Any agreement reached is likely to afford relatively low levels of protection to workers 
within the Community, reflecting the terms of the EC Treaty proposal diluted for the 
benefit of the UK, rather than previous proposals which present a higher level of 
protection. 
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Where an agreement is reached within the negotiation process, it is unlikely to remain as 
such. The implementation of agreements by the "procedures and practices specific to 
management and labour and the Member States" is impracticable considering the 
unknown legal status of a European collective agreement, the diversity in legal status of 
national collective agreements across the Member States, the insufficient proportion of 
the European workforce represented by the European level social partners and the lack 
of mandate accorded to them to bargain on behalf of their national member federations. 
In addition the Declaration on Article 4(2) ensures that Member States have no "gap 
fil l ing" role to play by guaranteeing the results imposed by an agreement both in terms 
of content and coverage. Implementation by this method would prove at most patchy and 
would be impossible to police. There seem few cases where the ETUC would not insist 
that the agreement be converted into a legally binding measure, in most cases a directive, 
by a Council decision. 
The conversion of agreements into directives seems to have an unhappy relationship with 
the last section of the Article 3b subsidiarity test concerning proportionality, which 
prefers non-binding regulation. There are, however, indications that a horizontal 
definition of subsidiarity is being applied at Community level. This interpretation is 
wider than that set out in Article 3b EC and based upon the origins of subsidiarity as a 
Catholic social doctrine. This wider interpretation may justify the conversion of 
agreements on the basis of the democratic participation of the social partners in the new 
legislative process. 
On closer inspection, however, the social dialogue does not seem to conform even to this 
horizontal interpretation of subsidiarity. First, "bargaining in the shadow of the law" and 
specifically in the shadow of previous EC Treaty proposals marginalises the effective 
input of the social partners in the creation of regulation. Second, the social dialogue 
procedure itself can be characterised as a corporatist arrangement which may not conform 
with the principles of democracy. 
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At present the practical importance of the role of the social dialogue therefore appears not 
to lie in its capacity to involve the social partners in the decision-making process so as 
to make the issues proposed or the content of regulation more responsive to the needs of 
the two sides of industry. Instead it has been used primarily as a mechanism to secure the 
adoption of legislation previously proposed for the 15, but blocked within the Council 
of Ministers due to the requirement of unanimity under Article 100 EC. The social 
dialogue fulfills a dual role in this respect. First, an agreement between the social 
partners or, even where an agreement is not concluded, any indication that both sides of 
industry recognise the need for regulation in a particular area and are ready to enter into 
negotiations, defeats any argument within the discussions of the Council of Ministers that 
proposed social legislation will have an excessive effect on competitiveness. Although 
it is the UK government who have been credited with this argument, there are indications 
that the certainty of UK objections may have masked the underlying, unstated fears of 
other Member States. Second, the consultation and consensus of the social partners 
appears to go some way towards legitimisation of regulation which affects only 14 out 
of the 15 Member States. 
The Future of Social Dialogue 
With only two examples of the end product of the social dialogue, the procedure is still 
in its infancy. The question arises as to whether the inadequacies outiined above are mere 
"teething" problems or whether they will prove to be longer lasting threats to the efficient 
functioning of the social dialogue. 
The situation of the SPA outside the main body of the EC Treaty was intended to be a 
temporary arrangement until such time as a future UK government would allow an 
amendment to Articles 117-119 EC. UK opinion polls have indicated that there is a real 
chance that the Labour Party under Tony Blair may come into office at the next election.^ 
The Labour Party has pledged that, in this event, it would be willing to agree to the SPA. 
Such a Treaty amendment would considerably reduce the problems with efficient 
^ An election must take place before May 1997. 
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consultation and negotiation associated with the pre-proposal of action under the EC 
Treaty and the dilution of proposals in order to attract the UK Conservative government's 
vote. 
The reactive nature of the dialogue may be less susceptible to political change. The 
interests of employers associations in the development of European social regulation are 
essentially negative and it seems unlikely that they would agree to negotiate on own 
initiative agreements without the pressure of a Commission proposal. Even in the 
absence of the UK Conservative government the Commission is unlikely to propose the 
adoption of large-scale social action. The principle of subsidiarity is now firmly 
entrenched in the EC Treaty as a guiding principle for the development of Community 
law. In addition "New Labour" have indicated that they will not accept greatiy increased 
involvement in the social field at European level and have assured the business 
community that they will sanction nothing which would impair UK competitiveness.^ 
The corporatist tendencies of the social dialogue seem set to continue with the 3 main 
social partner organisations again excluding all other recognised associations within the 
discussions on part-time and temporary workers. However, when UEAPME's challenge'' 
to the legitimacy of these exclusionary negotiations reaches the Court of Justice, it is 
submitted that such negotiations will be protected to a large extent by the application of 
the principle of the autonomy of the social partners. However, the 3 main organisations 
may be forced to take more account of the views of organisations representing SMEs on 
the basis of Article 2(2) and the accompanying Declaration. 
Any possible implementation of agreements by the procedures and practices method 
seems increasingly impossible in the face of a continuing decline in the membership of 
Kampfner, "Labour Shift on Social Chapter", Financial Times, 5 August 1996; Taylor, "Unions 
Learn to Love Europe", Financial Times, August 27 1996 and Peston, "Blair Woos Business on 
Social Chapter" Financial Times, 16 July 1996. 
Case T-135/96, UEAPME v Council, not yet heard. 
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trade unions across many Member States.^  Neither does there seem to be the pohtical 
wil l to take steps towards the harmonisation of European collective labour law systems. 
Article 2(6), for example, prevents regulation on the subject of the right of association. 
The SPA has created the potential for the autonomous development of a collective labour 
regulation^ by the social partners. Article 4 provides the capacity to support a European 
social area regulated by a balance between binding legislation and collective agreements. 
The degree of divergence between national industrial relations systems is a major factor 
operating against this development.^ However, as economic integration increases 
European level "trajectories" in industrial relations issues seem to be emerging.^ High 
and persistent unemployment, for example, is a problem affecting all Member States.^  
In addition Europe-wide trends towards labour market flexibility, the growth of 
workplace bargaining and Human Resource Management'" can be detected. The need for 
the protection of the worker in the face of increasing European management structures" 
has already been recognised at Community level with the adoption of the European 
Works Council Directive. 
The European level social partners seem unwilling to rise to this challenge and it seems 
that their role under the social dialogue wil l for the time being be confined to assisting 
in the creation of European social legislation. 
9 
10 
See Annex 7, Visser, "European Trade Unions: The Transition Years" in Hyman and Ferner (eds), 
New Frontiers in European Industrial Relations, Blackwell, 1994 and Hyman, "European Unions: 
Towards 2000", (1991) 5 Work, Employment and Society, 621-639, at 621. 
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See Annex 2. 
Teague and Grahl, Industrial Relations and European Integration, London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1992, Ch 7. 
Marginson and Sisson, "The Structure of Transnational Capital in Europe: The Emerging Euro-
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ANNEXES 
ANNEX 1 
T H E PROTOCOL AND AGREEMENT ON SOCIAL POLICY 
PROTOCOL ON SOCIAL P O L I C Y 
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
NOTING that eleven Member States, that is to say the Kingdom of Belgium, the 
Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the 
Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy 
of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, wish to 
continue along the path laid down in the 1989 Social Charter; that they have adopted 
among themselves an Agreement to this end; that this Agreement is annexed to the 
Protocol; that this Protocol and the said Agreement are without prejudice to the 
provisions of this Treaty, particularly those which relate to social policy which constitute 
an integral part of the "acquis communautaire": 
1 Agree to authorise those eleven Member States to have recourse to the 
institutions, procedures and mechanisms of the Treaty for the purposes of taking among 
themselves and applying as far as they are concerned the acts and decisions required for 
giving effect to the above-mentioned Agreement. 
2 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland shall not take part in 
the deliberations and the adoption by the Council of Commission proposals made on the 
basis of this Protocol and the above-mentioned Agreement. 
By way of derogation from Article 148(2) of the Treaty, acts of the Council which are 
made pursuant to this Protocol and which must be adopted by a qualified majority shall 
be deemed to be so adopted i f they have received at least 52 votes in favour. The 
unanimity of the members of the Council, with the exception of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, shall be necessary for acts of the Council which must 
be adopted unanimously and for those amending the Commission proposal. 
Acts adopted by the Council and any financial consequences other than administrative 
costs entailed for the institutions shall not be applicable to the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland. 
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A G R E E M E N T ON SOCIAL P O L I C Y CONCLUDED B E T W E E N T H E 
M E M B E R STATES OF T H E EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WITH T H E 
E X C E P T I O N OF T H E UNITED KINGDOM OF G R E A T BRITAIN AND 
NORTHERN IRELAND 
The undersigned eleven HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, that is to say the Kingdom 
of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic 
Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Portuguese 
Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Member States"), 
WISHING to implement the 1989 Social Charter on the basis of the "acquis 
communautaire", 
CONSIDERING the Protocol on social policy, 
HAVE AGREED as follows: 
Article 1 
The Community and the Member States shall have as their objectives the promotion of 
employment, improved living and working conditions, proper social protection, dialogue 
between management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to 
lasting high employment and the combatting of exclusion. To this end the Community 
and the Member States shall implement measures which take account of the diverse 
forms of national practice, in particular in the filed of contractual relations, and the need 
to maintain the competitiveness of the Community economy. 
Article 2 
1 With a view to achieving the objectives of Article 1, the Community shall support 
and complement the activities of the Member States in the following fields: 
improvement in particular of the working environment to protect workers' health 
and safety; 
working conditions; 
the informadon and consultadon of workers; 
equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and 
treatment at work; 
the integration of persons excluded form the labour market, without prejudice to 
Article 127 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter 
referred to as "the Treaty". 
2 To this end, the Council may adopt, by means of directives, minimum 
requirements for gradual implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical 
rules obtaining in each of the Member States. Such directives shall avoid imposing 
administrative, financial and legal constraints in a way which would hold back the 
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creation and development of small and medium-sized undertakings. 
The Council shall act in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189c of the 
Treaty after consulting the Economic and Social Committee. 
3 However, the Council shall act unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, 
after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, in the 
following areas: 
social security and social protection of workers; 
protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated; 
representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, 
including co-determination, subject to paragraph 6; 
conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in 
Community territoiy; 
financial contributions for promotion of employment and job-creation, without 
prejudice to the provisions relating to the Social Fund. 
4 A Member State may entrust management and labour, at their joint request, with 
the implementation of directives adopted pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3. 
In this case, it shall ensure that, no later than the date on which a directive must be 
transposed in accordance with Article 189, management and labour have introduced the 
necessary measure enabling it at any time to be in a position to guarantee the results 
imposed by that Directive. 
5 The provisions adopted pursuant to this Article shall not prevent any Member 
State from maintaining or introducing more stringent preventative measures compatible 
with the Treaty. 
6 The provisions of this Article shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the 
right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs. 
Article 3 
1 The Commission shall have the task of promoting the consultation of 
management and labour at Community level and shall take any relevant measure to 
facilitate their dialogue by ensuring balanced support for the parties. 
2 To this end, before submitting proposals in the social policy field, the 
Commission shall consult management and labour on the possible direction of 
Community action. 
3 If, after such consultation, the Commission considers Conmiunity action 
advisable, it shall consult management and labour on the content of the envisaged 
proposal. Management and labour shall forward to the Commission an opinion or, where 
appropriate, a recommendation. 
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On the occasion of such consultation, management and labour may inform the 
Commission of their wish to initiate the process provided for in Article 4. The duration 
of the procedure shall not exceed nine months, unless the management and labour 
concerned and the Commission decide jointly to extend it. 
Article 4 
1 Should management and labour so desire, the dialogue between them at 
Community level may lead to contractual relations, including agreements. 
2 Agreements concluded at Community level shall be implemented either in 
accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the 
Member States or, in matters covered by Article 2, at the joint request of the signatory 
parties, by a Council decision on a proposal from the Commission. 
The Council shall act by qualified majority, except where the agreement in question 
contains one or more of the provisions relating to one of the areas referred to in Article 
2(3), in which case it shall act unanimously. 
Article 5 
With a view to achieving the objectives of Article 1 and without prejudice to the other 
provisions of the Treaty, the Commission shall encourage cooperation between the 
Member States and facilitate the coordination of their action in all social policy fields 
under this Agreement. 
Article 6 
1 Each Member State shall ensure that the principle of equal pay for male and 
female workers for equal work is applied. 
2 For the purpose of this Article, 'pay' means the ordinary basic or minimum wage 
or salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the worker 
receives directly or indirectly, in respect of his employment, from his employer. 
Equal pay without discrimination based on sex means: 
(a) that pay for the same work at piece rates shall be calculated on the basis 
of the same unit of measurement; 
(b) that pay for work at time rates shall be the same for the same job. 
3 This Article shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting 
measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for women to 
pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in their 
professional careers. 
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Article 7 
The Commission shall draw up a report each year on progress in achieving the objectives 
of Article 1, including the demographic situation in the Community. It shall forward the 
report to the European Parliament, the Council and the Economic and Social Committee. 
The European Parliament may invite the Commission to draw up reports on particular 
problems concerning the social situation. 
DECLARATIONS 
1 Declaration on Article 2(2) 
The eleven High Contracting Parties note that in the discussions on Article 2(2) of the 
Agreement it was agreed that the Community does not intend, in laying down minimum 
requirements for the protection of the safety and health of employees, to discriminate in 
a manner unjustified by the circumstances against employees in small and medium-sized 
undertakings. 
2 Declarafion on Article 4(2) 
The eleven High Contracting Parties declare that the first of the arrangements for 
application of the agreements between management and labour Community-wide -
referred to in Article 4(2) - will consist in developing, by collective bargaining according 
to the rules of each Member State, the content of the agreements, and that consequently 
this arrangement implies no obligation on the Member States to apply the agreements 
directly or to work out rules for their transposition, nor any obligation to amend national 
legislation in force to facilitate their implementation. 
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ANNEX 2 
UNEMPLOYMENT IN T H E EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
(Percentage of the Civilian Labour Force) 
60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 
Source: "Employment Policy in the European Commuunity: Lessons From the USA", Hanson, 
Institute of Directors Research Paper, 1995 
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ANNEX 3 
AGREEMENT OF 31 OCTOBER 1991 
(Brussels, 31 October 1991) 
Article 118 
4. A Member State may entrust management and labour at their joint request with 
the implementation of the directives adopted in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3. 
In that event, it shall see to it that (no later than the date of entry into force of a directive) 
management and labour have established the requisite measures by agreement between 
themselves, but the Member State concerned shall take such action as is needed to enable 
it at all times to secure the results to be achieved by virtue of the directive. 
Article 118a 
1. The Commission's task is to promote the consultation of the social partners at 
Community level and take any measure to usefully facilitate their dialogue, ensuring a 
balanced support of the parties. 
2. For this purpose, before presenting its proposals in the field of social policy, the 
Commission will consult the social partners on the possible guidelines for a Community 
action. 
3. If, after consultation, the Commission considers that a Community action is 
desirable, it will consult with the social partners regarding the content of the envisaged 
proposal. The social partners transmit to the Commission an opinion or, i f appropriate, 
a recommendation. 
4. In the course of this consultation the social partners may inform the Commission 
of their desire to engage the process provided for in Article 118b(l) and (2). This 
procedure may not exceed nine months' duration, unless an extension is jointiy agreed 
by the social partners concerned. 
Article 118b 
1. The dialogue between social partners at Community level can lead, i f the latter 
so desire, to relations based on agreements. 
2. Those agreements concluded at Community level may be realised either according 
to the procedures and practices appropriate to the social partners and to the Member 
136 
States or in matters covered by Article 118, at the joint request of the signatories, on the 
basis of a decision of the Council on a proposal from the Commission, with regard to the 
agreements as they have been concluded. This decision will follow the voting procedures 
of Article 118. 
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ANNEX 4 
OPERATIONAL CHART SHOWING THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE AGREEMENT ON SOCIAL POLICY 
First consultation 
Commission 
initiative 
Consultation on the 
possible direction 
of community action 
No further action 
Second consultation Continue 
Consultation on the 
Content of the 
envisaged Proposal 
\ Consufla/on 
\ fracii 
Negotiation between 
social partners 
E P en E S C 
informed 
Failure (E.P. and E S C informed) 
Agreement betv/een 
social partners 
Implementation 
in accordance with 
national practices 
of social partners 
Opinion or 
recommendation 
of social partners 
Draft Commission 
proposal 
_L 
Joint request 
to the Commission for 
extension to all workers 
Refy 
(reasoiis to 
l>e given) 
Council discussion in 
accordance with article 2 K 
7 1 / 
Commission proposal i ^ 
for a Council Decision 
Cooperat 
i \ 
I •• 
Depending 
on subject 
Consuttation 
Adoption of 
instrument 
E.P. and E S C 
informed 
Council 
Agreement 
Council 
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Source: Commission, Communication Concerning the Application of the Agreement on 
Social Policy, COM(93) 600 final, 14 December 1993, Annex 4 
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ANNEX 5 
Trade Union Membership 1990-91 
As per cent of labour force 
100 
80 4 
60 4 
Bel Den Fra Go- Gre Ire a Lux Ndh POT Sp UK 3we* Fm* Ain* 
Countiy 
Source: Lecher, Trade Unions in the European Union, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 
1994,91 
*Jensen, Madsen & Due, "A Role for a Pan-European Trade Union Movement? 
- Possibilities in European IR-Regulation", (1995) 26IRJ, 4-18, at 9, figures for 
1990 
ANNEX 6 
SOCIAL PARTNERS' ORGANISATIONS CURRENTLY 
COMPLYING WITH T H E CRITERIA SET OUT IN T H E 
COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION, PARA 24 
1 General Cross-Industry Organisations 
UNICE - Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe 
CEEP - European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation 
ETUC - European Trade Union Confederation 
2 Cross-Industry Organisations Representing Certain Categories of 
Workers or Undertakings 
UEAPME - European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises 
CEC - Confederation Europeenne des Cadres 
Eurocadres 
3 Specific Organisations 
EUROCHAMBRES 
4 Sectoral Organisations With No Cross-Industry Affiliation 
Eurocommerce 
COPA/COGECA 
AECI - Association of European Co-operative Insurers 
BIPAR - International Association of Insurance and Reinsurance 
Intermediaries 
CEA - European Insurance Committee 
Banking Federation of the European Conamunity 
GCECEE - Savings Banks Group of the European Community 
Association of Cooperative Banks of the EC 
ETA - European Timber Association 
HOTREC - Confederation of the National Hotel and Restaurant Associations 
in the European Community 
European Construction Industry Federation 
ERA - European Regional Airlines Association 
ICAA - International Civil Aiiports Association 
Association des Transports Aeriens a la Demande 
AECI - Association of European Community Airlines 
AEA - Association of European Airlines 
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Organisation Europeenne des Bateliers 
International Union for Liland Navigation 
European Community Shipowners Association 
Community of European Railways 
International Road Transport Union 
Source: COM(93) 600 final. Communication Concerning the Application of the 
Agreement on Social Policy, Brussels, 14 December 1993, Annex 2. 
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ANNEX 8 
Representativeness of the ETUC 
Bel Den Fra Ger Ore Ire It Lux Neth Per Sp UK 
Countiy 
No of members of ETUC g Workers outside the ETUC 
Source: Social Partners Study, Commission of the EC, Doc V/6141/93, Annex n 
A Social Portrait of Europe, Eurostat, 1996, 81 
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